

# Does the Apple Fall Far from the Tree? Agents of Socialization of Students' Ideological Orientations

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*Source / Izvornik:* **Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva : časopis za politologiju, 2021, 18, 55 - 80**

**Journal article, Published version**

**Rad u časopisu, Objavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)**

<https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.09>

*Permanent link / Trajna poveznica:* <https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:118:278151>

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*Download date / Datum preuzimanja:* **2025-01-12**

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# DOES THE APPLE FALL FAR FROM THE TREE? AGENTS OF SOCIALIZATION OF STUDENTS' IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS<sup>1</sup>

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<https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.09>

Original Scientific Article

Received: June 4<sup>th</sup> 2021

Accepted: August 31<sup>st</sup> 2021

**Abstract** The paper presents the results of a survey that assessed the impact of informal and formal agents of the political socialization (PS) process on a sample of students enrolled at the University of Rijeka (N = 635). The correlation between the participants' ideological self-identification (PIS) and the assessed ideological orientation of their parents (PIO) was analyzed. Students believe that no agent of socialization has even moderately influenced the formation of their political views and assess the weakest influence of the formal PS agent – teachers in primary and secondary schools. The participants believe that parents have influenced their political attitudes more than other agents, but assess this influence on average as weak, regardless of whether they place their parents in the same or different positions on the ideological orientation (IO) scale. Left- and right-oriented participants admit a somewhat stronger influence of their parents' informal PS than those who rank themselves in the center. Statistically significant correlations between PIS and the perceived PIO were obtained. A small share of participants does not perceive a similarity between their own and their parents' IO and there is a negligible share of those who place their parents in diametrically opposed positions on the scale. The participants who have a greater interest in politics and those from a more politically stimulating environment are more inclined to move away from the political center and their parents' IO. Concordance between family IOs increases with the perception of better relationships with parents.<sup>2</sup>

**Keywords** political socialization, agents of socialization, ideological orientations, students

<sup>1</sup> This work has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka under the project number uniri-drustv-18-226.

<sup>2</sup> Acronym list and meaning: PS – political socialization; PIS – participants' ideological self-identification; PIO – parents' ideological orientation; FIO – family ideological orientation; IO – ideological orientation; SES – socio-economic status.

## Introduction

The existing research reveals that, both globally and in Croatia, citizens show little interest in politics, have very little trust in political institutions, and participate poorly in elections (Gross, 2016; Sekulić and Šporer, 2010; Ančić, Baketa and Kovačić, 2019; Ježovita, 2019). This is especially observable in the decline of conventional political participation of young people (Dalton, 2008; Sloam, 2016; Gvozdanović, Ilišin, Adamović, Potočnik, Baketa, and Kovačić, 2019). Young people also express high levels of distrust in "formal government institutions and their potential correctors" (Ilišin, 2014: 250). Are the weak interest in politics, modest political participation, and distrust in political institutions indicators of the failure of political socialization (PS), i.e., the failed generational transmission of political attitudes or are they a matter of successful transmission, i.e., acceptance of political views characteristic of their parents' generation?

Scholars agree that PS is a lifelong process that occurs most intensively in childhood and adolescence, most often in a family environment (Gecas, 2000; Kudrnač, 2015). Thus formed political attitudes, such as political orientation, political preferences, and interest in politics, are challenging to change in later life. Traditional PS approaches hold that the patterns formed are petrified, thereby underestimating or completely neglecting the actors' role in the process and the impact of changes in the social context. Recent PS approaches emphasize children's and youth's roles and understand PS as a two-way and even reciprocal process (Gordon and Taft, 2011).

For the analysis of the PS process, it is important to take into account the socio-historical context in which the transmission of social and political values and orientations to new generations takes place. In this context, Šiber points out that, in a situation of sudden and significant changes in the social system and political structures, PS takes place in circumstances where the values and norms of the previous order tend to be replaced by new ones that will correspond to the socio-political and economic relations on which the new order is based. He believes that such a PS context is characteristic of countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe (Šiber, 1998). Ilišin highlights that the experiences of most post-socialist countries have shown that democratic transition is a relatively long and difficult process in which the new political order faces difficulties that slow down and partly distort desirable democratic processes (Ilišin, 1998). Transitional changes in Croatian society were marked by divisions between the normative and the real, between the proclaimed new democratic values and serious authoritarian aberrations of political power (Maldini, 2005). This process was also marked by contradictions at the sociocultural level, which were manifested through the conflict and intertwining of individualistic and collectivist social values in the lifestyles of young people (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007). Aware of these challenges and contradictions of the transition of Croatian society, in our research, we wished to explore the degree of concordance between the students' and their parents' political orientations, how family characteristics affect students' interest in politics and their political orientations, and how students overestimate the impact of various socialization agents on their personal attitudes.

## Agents of political socialization

Wasburn and Adkins Covert, expanding upon Sears' division (Sears, 1990, according to Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017), list six perspectives for understanding

PS: *The persistence perspective, the lifetime openness perspective, the impressionable years perspective, the life cycle perspective, the genetic approach, and the life course model.* In order to present the theoretical-conceptual framework of the empirical analysis of our obtained data, we will briefly sketch out the basic theses of the first two perspectives. *The persistence perspective* argues that childhood is key to the PS process and that the basic structure of an individual's political attitudes is formed by early adolescence. In primary socialization within the family and school and peer groups, basic political attitudes are learned, adopted, and formed, and are only modified later in life, thus successfully maintaining the status quo of the political system. Critics hold against this perspective its neglect of children's role in transmitting attitudes (Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015) because children are not their parents' clones even though they most often have similar political attitudes. From the persistence perspective, there should be a high degree of concordance in children's and their parents' IO, and children should see their parents as an important agent of their PS. *The lifetime openness perspective* holds that PS is a lifelong process that continues in post-adolescence, as people shape their political views in accordance with new life circumstances. Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) highlight that the political attitudes of most people do not change significantly during their lives and warn that this is because they choose partners and an environment that shares political attitudes identical to those they had adopted in primary socialization. Despite that, this perspective recognizes the possibility that individuals exposed to changing work and living circumstances may abandon the adopted and shape new political attitudes. For example, studying as a new life stage could influence the participants' political attitudes, so their IO could be different from their parents' IO. The thesis offers an explanation of these differences on the liberalizing effect of education on the example of attitudes about ethnic distance (Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst and Gerris, 2004). "Although parents affect their children's level of ethnic distance, their influence cannot compete with the importance of the educational effect" (Hello et al., 2004: 264).

Discussions on the importance of individual socialization agents in the transmission of political attitudes problematize the impact of family upbringing and climate, peer groups, educational institutions, volunteer organizations, religious organizations/communities, and the media (Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017). The most accepted thesis in the literature relates to the family as the essential PS agent (Hyman, 1959; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009; Rico and Jennings, 2016). The key argument supporting this thesis is the great similarity between the parents' and children's political attitudes (Rico and Jennings, 2016), i.e., the thesis that there are common family political attitudes (Kudrnač, 2015). It is believed that the level of parental interest in politics, the concordance between the parents' political views, and the quality of the parent-child relationships are crucial factors of successful transmission. Jennings and Niemi (1974) distinguish between direct and indirect PS forms. Direct PS occurs when parents intentionally teach their children, while indirect PS is manifested under the influence of the family climate on shaping children's political worldview. Šiber emphasizes that, in general, indirect PS refers to the acquisition of characteristics that in and of themselves are not political but affect the development of one's political personality through the process of transfer, apprenticeship, and generalization, while direct PS refers to the transfer of highly political content and orientation through the process of imitations, anticipatory socializations, political experience, and political education (Šiber, 1998: 130-131).

In the context of the family impact on PS, Jennings and Niemi (1974) feel that parents significantly impact the shaping of their children's attitudes and values due to the intra-familial emotional connection. Hess and Torney (Hess and Torney 1968, according to Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Burns, 2005) consider that PS in the family takes place in three ways. *Intentional PS* occurs through family conversations and parental instruction, by which parents seek to explicitly convey their political views to children (*accumulation model*). Part of this process is the parental control of the political environment through the choice of children's friends and the selection of media information that enters the family space in which children move. Of course, today, it is increasingly difficult to control the information to which children are exposed, and the former mechanisms of influence are no longer common to the whole family (e.g., family TV time) but are rather individualized (use of the Internet and communication via social networks) (Buckingham, 2009). Furthermore, transmission occurs by conveying attitudes when children *identify* with their parents as role models and mimic their political behavior (Rico and Jennings, 2016). The third form (*model of interpersonal transmission*) of indirect and unintentional PS occurs through the *influence of the family's socio-economic status* (SES) because the sharing of a common social context affects political participation and political preferences (Verba et al., 2005). Children's political worldview is shaped through everyday life experience under the influence of the family's political atmosphere, for example, in adult discussions in which children only passively participate. The importance of family SES is advocated by Henn and Foard (2014), who find that class affiliation has a key influence on the political participation of young people in the UK. The authors find that children from middle-class families are more interested in politics than working-class children. Other authors place the cultural aspect of SES in the foreground instead of the class one. Verba et al. (2005) emphasize the importance of the parents' education as the most easily measurable determinant of the family SES, as research reveals that more educated parents show greater interest in politics, are more politically engaged, and discuss politics more often so that such a family climate is "politically more stimulating". Families with a higher level of cultural capital encourage children's motivation for higher educational achievement, which is also associated with greater political engagement. Hello et al. (2004) determined a similar effect of education, "the higher the parents' social positions were, the higher young adults' educational attainment, which in turn has a negative effect on young adults' ethnic distance ... which means that parents affect their children's ethnic distance indirectly through their educational attainment" (Hello et al. 2004: 263).

Rico and Jennings (2016) believe that the family's influence in the PS process depends on the level of the parents' political engagement, as politicized sons and daughters are children of politicized parents. Dostie-Goulet (2009) also claims that the level of children's politics is influenced by the politics of a tempered family climate, a "politically stimulating home". Hess and Torney (according to Verba et al., 2005) call this socialization through family experience, which is generalized later in life. Another factor that significantly contributes to a successful generational transmission is parental political homogeneity, as parents' and children's political attitudes and behaviors are more similar when both parents have the same political views (Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier, 2007; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015).

Parents with matching political views send children consistent, non-contradictory information, while in the case of parents' different political views, these messages are contradictory and confusing (Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015). Important factors

are the quality of family interactions, the affective relationship between parents and children, and the type of family communication. Parental support increases the sense of belonging to the family community and acceptance of their political preferences. Ojeda and Hatemi emphasize that social support encourages motivation but does not necessarily lead to the same identification because some children will accept, while others will oppose their parents' party identification. In this context, Ojeda and Hatemi emphasize the two-way nature of the PS process, "we show that children play a critical role in the transmission of party identification; how children perceive and respond to parental values affects their own values" (Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015: 1152). Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier (2007) find that parental influence in PS is stronger if family political attitudes deviate from the "spirit of the time" (*zeitgeist*). Thus, the concordance of the parents and their child's political attitudes will be greater if they differ from the dominant attitudes in society. Some authors advocate the *model of direct transition* according to which political attitudes adopted in childhood are quite permanent. "Children who acquire political predispositions early in life from their parents are more stable in their early adulthood than are those who 'leave home without it'" (Jennings, et al., 2009:796). Based on this view, the political worldview has features that we find in religiosity, i.e., the patterns adopted in childhood are difficult and extremely rare to change. Others (Koskimaa and Rapeli, 2015) believe that the family is key to the development of political identity. However, the political worldview is later modified in interactions in peer groups, with relatives, and neighbors. In support of this, Ojeda and Hatemi (2015) find that the concordance of the parents and children's political identification is much weaker than assumed. Hooghe and Boonen (2015) find that children are more like parents in the ideological orientation than in party preferences. Andersson (2015) elaborates on the thesis of *situational political socialization* that considers changes in the modern world (new digital media, consumerism, cultural diversity, and individualism), which lead to new forms of political engagement. The author claims that PS is particular and contextual and that it is essentially determined by the space in which it takes place. It is considered that, along with the family as the most important agent of the informal PS, the education system is the most important agent of the formal PS of children/youth in society.

Its function is the transmission of the dominant value and political worldview. The importance of school in PS theories is based on the assumption that the school curriculum and teachers' work contribute to the development of a politically conscious citizen who adopts democratic values. Niemi and Sobieszek (1977) argue that prolonged retention in the education system increases its importance in shaping young people's political attitudes. Campbell (2008) finds a positive impact of an open school climate and peer groups on adolescents' political behavior. Nevertheless, research detects a weaker influence of the school on young people's political attitudes compared to other agents. Quintelier (2015) finds that school has less influence on the political participation of Belgian adolescents than peer groups and families. The author claims that parents have an important role in encouraging young people's political participation but that peer groups and volunteer associations that contribute to the development of skills needed for PS are even more important. Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) also debate the importance of the school system's impact on youth politics in the U.S. today. Koskimaa and Rapeli (2015) found that the political interest of young Finns is more strongly influenced by discussions and political interest in peer groups than by the formal education system. Andersson (2015)

believes that an analysis of the impact of formal political agents fails to detect the specifics of young people's new political engagement. "It is important to understand new forms of political socialization in different spaces and places in the democratic contingent media society" (Andersson, 2015: 981). Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) note that traditional PS agents (parents, teachers) use media content and, based on them, "construct the presentations of political reality which they deliver to their audiences" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017: 78). Traditional mass media (newspapers, television, and radio) influence the political nature of the audience by giving importance to certain topics and ways of their presentation.<sup>3</sup>

We can conclude that research finds different patterns of intergenerational transmissions of political attitudes in different social contexts. Contrary to the current trend of growing international interest in research on political socialization from the sociological perspective (Kudrnač, 2015), in Croatia, it is extremely rare.<sup>4</sup> We can single out research that problematizes differences in attitudes about ethnic diversity and students' and their parents' social distance conducted on a national sample (Čačić-Kupmes, Gregurović and Kumpes, 2014) and an analysis of the relationship between the students' political preferences and their parents' perceived political preferences on a sample of University of Zagreb students (Jović, Brezovec and Balabanić, 2021). The research whose results are presented in the continuation of this paper analyzes the importance of informal and formal PS agents from the students' perspective. In analyzing the intergenerational transmission of IO, it should be taken into account that contradictory processes simultaneously mark the recent development of Croatian society: re-traditionalization that affirms collective values, including the traditional family hierarchy, and liberalization that affirms individual values, such as privacy and independence (Ilišin and Gvozdanić, 2016; Sekulić, 2012). In addition, research involving the entire population uncovers low interest in politics (Ančić, et al., 2019) and low trust in political institutions (Sekulić and Šporer, 2010), and the share of citizens who went to the polls in recent years is evidence of weak conventional political participation.<sup>5</sup>

## Methodology

This research aims to analyze students' perceptions of the influence of particular socialization agents on their political attitudes. The transmission of political attitudes is analyzed through the PIS relationship with their perception of PIO. The following questions are discussed:

1. How much importance do participants attach to particular agents in the process of their PS?
2. To what extent do PIS coincide with and differ from PIO?

<sup>3</sup> Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) also add religious organizations to the list of PS agents that can contribute to legitimizing the political system, offer a worldview that can encourage a propensity for a political option that is close to that worldview, and encourage social distance towards individual groups.

<sup>4</sup> Although PS can be analyzed and explained from both the political science and psychological perspective, this paper approaches this phenomenon from a sociological perspective, however contextually respecting the findings by political science.

<sup>5</sup> For example, in the official Report of the State Electoral Commission, we find that 51.2% of voters in the first round and 55% in the second round voted in the election of the President of the Republic of Croatia ([www.izbori.hr](http://www.izbori.hr), 2021).

3. What is the correlation between the assessment of the family's impact as a PS agent and the concordance between PIS and PIO?
4. To what extent are family characteristics (parents' political homogeneity, family climate tempered by politics, and parent-child relationships) related to the concordance between PIS and PIO?
5. To what extent are familial socio-demographic characteristics connected with the PIS and PIO concordance and the assessment of the importance of PS agents?

Starting from *the persistence perspective*, this research tests the following hypotheses:

- H1. The stimulating family political climate is related to the participants' interest in politics.
- H2. The participants consider their parents to be a more important PS agent than all other agents.
- H3. Participants' assessment of the importance of parents as PS agents is related to the characteristics of the family political climate.
- H4. PIS and the perceived PIO largely coincide.
- H5. The level of similarity between PIS and the perceived PIO is related to the characteristics of the family political climate.

### *Measuring instruments*<sup>6</sup>

A five-point scale of the frequency of family discussions on political topics and the parents' political homogeneity were taken as indicators of the family political climate.<sup>7</sup> A direct question measured the participants' interest in politics.

The participants assessed<sup>8</sup> on a five-point scale the impact of each of the following socialization agents on their political attitudes: *father, mother, other relatives, best friend, peer group, the media, primary school teachers, and secondary school teachers*. In an additional question, the participants were asked to assess which of the listed agents decisively influenced their political attitudes.<sup>9</sup>

As an indicator of the participants' political attitudes, a seven-degree scale of ideological orientation (three degrees on the left, one in the center, and three degrees on the right) was used, which in some analyses, due to statistical correctness,<sup>10</sup> was reduced to three categories (left, center, right).<sup>11</sup> In addition to their own, the

<sup>6</sup> Variables from previous surveys of young people (Ilišin et al., 2013) and students (Ilišin, 2014) conducted by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (IDIZ) were also used in creating the questionnaire.

<sup>7</sup> The categories of possible answers are shown in the text and tables, so we will not list them further due to spatial restrictions.

<sup>8</sup> Research on the transmission of political attitudes can be conducted using longitudinal research or a subsequent (retrospective) assessment of participants on the impact of individual agents on their attitudes. A retrospective method was used in this study.

<sup>9</sup> For the purposes of statistical analysis, the crucial influence of mother and of father were merged into a single new variable: the influence of parents on PS.

<sup>10</sup> The reason for merging the categories is the fact that, in some categories of responses, there is a relatively small number of participants and in the original scale with seven categories, too many cells with too few responses ("empty or skinny cells") emerged in the implementation of chi squares.

<sup>11</sup> IO was taken as the only indicator of political attitudes because very few participants answered



participants were asked to assess the ideological orientation of their mother and father. For the purposes of the analysis, we created two new dichotomous variables: (1) concordance of the PIO – both parents have the same or different IO; (2) concordance of family ideological orientation (FIO) – the participants and parents have the same or different IOs. Two new variables were created based on the position on the IO scale: (1) concordance of the PIO, with four categories: both are on the left, both are in the center, both are on the right, in different positions on the scale; (2) concordance of the FIO, also with four categories: the participant and both parents are located (1) on the left, (2) in the center, (3) on the right, (4) in a different position on the scale.

The following sociodemographic variables were also used: sex, settlement size, areas of peace and war, mother's and father's education level, subjective assessment of the family socioeconomic status (SES), and assessment within family relationships, separately for both parents.

### *Data collection and sample description*

The paper is based on the results of a survey conducted during classes on a convenience sample of students from eight components of the University of Rijeka in 2015<sup>12</sup> (N = 635). The data were processed in the statistical package SPSS 24 at the univariate and bivariate analysis level (see Table 1).<sup>13</sup>

## **Results and discussion**

### *Family political climate and interest in politics*

Before analyzing the influence of PS agents on the transmission of political attitudes, we will present the results of the family climate characteristics and the participants' interest in politics. The family climate was measured with two "political" variables: the frequency of family discussions about politics and the concordance of both parents' IO and the previously presented assessment of the participants' overall relationship with their parents.

Most participants' family climate is tempered by discussions about political content either occasionally (41.3%) or frequently (18.9%). Less than a tenth of the sample (7.4%) never discuss politics in the family, and less than a third of them (29.3%) do so

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questions about party preference and party affiliation. Despite the fact that three-quarters of the participants (73.2%) expressed their intention to go to the polls, only a quarter of them have a clear idea of which party they would vote for, and only every twentieth is a member of a political party.

<sup>12</sup> Students from the following University constituents participated in the research: Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies, Faculty of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Faculty of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Law, Department of Physics, Department of Informatics, Faculty of Engineering, and Faculty of Teacher Education. We thank all the colleagues who helped conduct the survey.

<sup>13</sup> Chi-square tests, t-tests, and analysis of the variance were performed. In ANOVA, a test of homogeneity of the variance, was performed, the F-ratio was tested, and posthoc multiple comparison tests were performed. The Scheffe test was used in the case of homogeneous variances, and the Tamhane T2 test in the case of inhomogeneous variances. Due to spatial restrictions, the statistical values of p in all analyses will be presented with the notation \* for  $p < 0.01$  and the notation \*\* for  $p < 0.001$ .

**Table 1.** Participants' sociodemographic characteristics (%)

<b>Sex<sup>14</sup></b>	<b>Areas of:<sup>15</sup></b>		
Female	60.9	Peace	75.2
Male	38.4	War	21.8
<b>Father's education</b>	<b>Mother's education</b>		
Elementary school	2.9	Elementary school	5.4
Three-year high school	14.7	Three-year high school	8.7
Four-year high school	42.7	Four-year high school	47.9
College	17.8	College	14.0
University	20.6	University	22.9
<b>Family cultural capital<sup>16</sup></b>	<b>Assessment of SES<sup>17</sup></b>		
Elementary school	0.9	Significantly worse than others	1.6
Three-year high school	6.9	Slightly worse than others	6.9
Four-year high school	38.0	Neither better nor worse than others	54.6
College	21.1	Slightly better than others	30.3
University	32.0	Significantly better than others	6.5
<b>Assessment of the relationship with the mother<sup>18</sup></b>	<b>Assessment of the relationship with the father</b>		
None	0.3	None	0.9
Extremely bad	0.5	Extremely bad	2.7
Mostly bad	0.8	Mostly bad	3.0
Sometimes good, sometimes bad	7.6	Sometimes good, sometimes bad	12.0
Mostly good	27.6	Mostly good	31.9
Extremely good	62.5	Extremely good	45.6
Not alive	0.5	Not alive	3.5
<b>Settlement size</b>	<b>Assessed relationship with both parents<sup>19</sup></b>		
Up to 1.000	20.8	Sometimes bad, sometimes good	21.5
1.001 – 10.000	37.3	Good	19.2
10.001 – 100.000	20.8	Extremely good	58.7
100.001 and above	20.0		

very rarely. It is reasonable to assume that family discussions on political topics are, in most cases, initiated by parents, because as many as half of the participants (51.8%) are mostly not interested or not interested at all in politics. A quarter of the sample is interested in politics, while a fifth (22.7%) is undecided. Only every twentieth par-

<sup>14</sup> Percentages of students who did not answer the question are not shown, except in cases where the number of abstainers is indicative.

<sup>15</sup> The variable of the participants' regional representation reveals a disproportion because more than half (61.6%) of participants come from two counties, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Istria, a fifth (21.7%) are from counties in central and northwestern Croatia, a tenth (9.3%) from the southeastern (Dalmatian) counties, and a very small share (4.3%) of participants are from the northeastern (Slavonian) counties. In further statistical processing, a new variable was formed in which the participants were classified into two categories important for understanding the social context in which they were socialized. The first category included participants from counties afflicted by direct warfare in the 1990s (21.8%), and the second category included students from counties in which there was no direct warfare (75.2%).

<sup>16</sup> Based on the education of both parents, a new independent variable Family cultural capital was constructed based on Wilekens' and Lievens' (2014) thesis on maximizing the family status. According to this thesis, there are common family cultural patterns determined by a parent who has a higher level of education. Since the participants whose parents have completed

ticipant shows great interest in politics, as opposed to five times as many (25.7%) of those who have no interest in politics.<sup>20</sup>

As in previous studies (van Deth, Abendschon, and Vollmar 2011; McIntosh, Hart, and Younissi, 2007), and in line with the expectations arising from the first hypothesis, it was found that when the frequency of family discussions increased, the participants' interest in politics also increased ( $\chi^2 = 156.702^{**}$ ;  $df = 6$ ; Cramer's  $V = .352$ ). Politics is not of interest to the vast majority of participants who never (85.1%) or very rarely (76.3%) discuss political topics in the family. In contrast, politics is of interest to more than half (56.2%) of those who often discuss it in the family.

Participants were asked to evaluate their parents' IO, and the results are shown in Figure 1. Most participants believe that they "know" their parents' IO. The distributions of the responses in both variables have a unimodal curve shape with a more pronounced left side.

The most numerous category in which the participants classify their mothers and fathers is the political center (37.1%, respectively). The remaining students ranked their parents as gravitating more towards the left (mothers 34%, fathers 30.6%) than the right side of the scale (mothers 21.6%, fathers 23.7%). When the seven-point scale was reduced to three categories (left-center-right), more than four-fifths (84.2%) of participants who answered these questions placed both parents on the same side of the scale ( $\chi^2 = 658.594^{**}$ ;  $df = 4$ ; Cramer's  $V = .755$ ). In other words, students perceive that there is a high level of ideological homogeneity between their parents.

The distribution of results on the newly created variable *Concordance of the parents' ideological orientation* shows that the most numerous category in which the participants place both parents is the center (35.3%), followed by those who placed both parents on the left (29.9%) and those who placed both parents on the right (19.0%). In cases where the participants consider their IO to be different from their parents (15.6%), the vast majority placed one parent in the center. Only every

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
only the primary school level are represented in a very small percentage, in further statistical analysis, they were added to the category Three-year high school for statistical correctness in all three educational variables.

<sup>17</sup> For the sake of correctness, in further statistical processing, categories *significantly* and *slightly worse* were merged into *worse than others*, and *significantly* and *slightly better* were merged into *better than others*.

<sup>18</sup> In further statistical analysis, the answers *none* and *not alive* were excluded from the variables of mother-father relationship assessment.

<sup>19</sup> Since the assumption of social learning theory that parental influence on PS is significant due to the emotional connection (Jennings and Niemi, 1974), we hypothesized that good intergenerational relationships would contribute to the successful transmission of political attitudes, reflected in greater recognition of parental influence and greater IO concordance. Based on the variables: *relationship with the mother* and *relationship with the father*, we created a new variable *Assessed relationship with both parents*, assuming that the family climate tempers the existence of a poor relationship with one parent. Due to the small proportion of those who assessed their relationship with their parents as poor, the new variable has only three modalities: 1. *sometimes bad, sometimes good* – those who assessed their relationship with at least one parent in this way; 2. *good* – those who assessed their relationship with both parents as mostly good; 3. *Extremely good* – those who rated the relationship with both parents as such or assessed it as exceptional with one parent and generally good with the other.

<sup>20</sup> The level of interest coincides with the results of a survey conducted on a national sample which found 21% of those interested versus 46.4% of those who were not interested (Ančić et al., 2019).



**Figure 1.** The perceived PIO (in %)

twentieth participant believes that they and their parents have opposite IOs, so they placed one parent on the left and the other on the right. Thus, most participants consider their PIOs to be identical, suggesting that they perceive the family political climate as harmonious and consistent. No statistical significance of the relationship of the variables of PIO concordance and the assessed quality of relationships with parents with the variable of the participants' interest in politics has been determined.

A politically stimulating home (Verba et al., 2005) is also determined by the elements of its SES, which means that external factors also determine the variations in the intentional family political socialization. ANOVA reveals that there is a statistically significant difference between participants from families of different levels of cultural capital in the variables *interest in politics* ( $F_{(627)} = 8.545^{**}$ ) and *frequency of family political discussions* ( $F_{(626)} = 6.134^*$ ). Political interest is the lowest ( $M = 2.32$ ), and politics is the least discussed ( $M = 2.66$ ) in families where both parents have a high school education. Interest is slightly higher ( $M = 2.75$ ), albeit still very weak, and discussions are more frequent ( $M = 2.95$ ) in families where at least one parent has a university degree. The reason behind the link between the parents' level of education and their children's political interest, observed in previous research (Lauglo, 2011), can be explained by differences in access to political resources, i.e., the differences in the family social capital.

In addition, it was found that there is a statistically significant difference in the interest in politics between female and male students ( $t = 2.403^*$ ),<sup>21</sup> thus confirming previous findings (Henn and Foard, 2014). Since these are participants with a similar level of education, the theory of gender socialization is more convincing than the theory of political resources in explaining this difference. Early gender socialization in childhood, dominant gender ideology, and practice in society suggest that politics is a "male job," thus silencing and dissuading women from the sphere of politics (Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017). However, it should be emphasized that interest in politics in both sexes is very weak.

<sup>21</sup> Men show a bit more interest ( $M = 2.67$ ) than women ( $M = 2.44$ ).

## Assessing the impact of PS agents

Table 2 shows that all socialization agents received an average score of less than 2.50. In other words, the participants, on average, believe that no agent of socialization has even had a mediocre influence on shaping their political views.

**Table 2.** To what extent have your political attitudes been influenced by (in %):

	1	2	3	4	5	N.A.	M	S.D.
Your father	33.86	22.52	24.09	15.43	2.83	1.26	2.30	1.18
Your mother	36.54	25.98	23.15	11.02	2.36	0.94	2.16	1.11
The media	37.95	25.04	23.46	10.08	2.20	1.26	2.12	1.10
Your friends/peers	53.07	22.83	18.27	3.94	0.79	1.10	1.75	0.94
Other relatives	57.32	15.12	13.23	4.25	1.73	8.35	1.67	1.01
Best friend	58.27	20.79	15.91	2.99	0.94	1.10	1.66	0.92
Teachers in high school	66.30	15.59	13.07	2.83	1.10	1.10	1.55	0.90
Teachers in elementary school	73.39	14.96	9.61	0.94	0.00	1.10	1.37	0.70

1. Not at all, 2. A little, 3. Somewhat, 4. A lot, 5. Extremely much

In line with the second hypothesis, the participants consider both parents to be a more important agent of their PS than all others, but even this influence was assessed as weak on average. As many as a third of participants believe that neither the mother nor father have had any influence on their political views. In contrast, only one in six participants acknowledged the strong (*a lot* and *extremely much*<sup>22</sup>) influence of the father, and only one in eight participants of the mother.

In addition to the parents, the only agent that more than half of the participants admit has had such an influence on shaping their attitudes is the media ( $M = 2.12$ ). The participants assessed the influence of their peers, other relatives, and friends as very weak, with more than half of them claiming these have had no influence at all and less than 6% to have significantly influenced their political views. The influence of primary school teachers is the weakest of all the agents offered, with less than 1% of participants acknowledging their strong influence and three-quarters claiming that there has been no influence at all. The participants, on average, acknowledged the slightly greater but still minimal influence of high school teachers with whom they were in contact at the most sensitive age of forming political attitudes.

The analysis reveals a significant correlation between the participants' assessments of the influence of the mother and father on their political attitudes (Table 3). The vast majority of participants in all categories claimed that the influence of both parents on their political views was identical.<sup>23</sup>

Contrary to the expectations, no statistically significant difference was found in the assessment of the parents' influence on one's political views with regards to the

<sup>22</sup> Due to statistical correctness, in further processing, categories *a lot* and *extremely much* were merged into one category.

<sup>23</sup> Shares range from two-thirds (*a little*) to four-fifths (*not at all*).

**Table 3.** Influence of mother and father on the participants' political attitudes (in %)

		FATHER'S INFLUENCE			
		Not at all	A little	Somewhat	A lot
MOTHER'S INFLUENCE	Not at all	80.1	8.7	6.9	4.3
	A little	8.5	68.3	12.2	11.0
	Somewhat	4.8	3.4	73.5	18.4
	A lot	10.6	7.1	10.6	71.8

$\chi^2 = 777.929^{**}$ ;  $df = 9$ ; Cramer's  $V = .643$


(non)existence of parents' political homogeneity in IO. Furthermore, it was revealed that the quality of the relationship with the mother is not, but with the father is, in a statistically significant relationship with the assessment of the influence of both parents as agents of socialization, which only partially confirms the third hypothesis. The mother has a greater ( $M = 2.56$ ) and the father a lesser influence ( $M = 1.97$ ) in families where the relationship with the father was assessed as ambivalent. If the participants assessed the relationship with the mother as such, the assessed father's influence in PS did not differ from the mother's influence. The father had a greater influence ( $M = 2.40$ ) in families where the relationships were extremely good than in those where they were ambivalent ( $M = 2.07$ ) ( $F_{(625)} = 4.485^*$ ).

ANOVA determined differences in the assessment of the influence of agents with respect to the sociodemographic characteristics of the participants' families. The mother's influence in PS is assessed to be somewhat more important (or, more precisely, less unimportant) in families with the highest ( $M = 2.35$ ) level of family education than in families with the lowest ( $M = 2.03$ ) level of cultural capital ( $F_{623} = 4.858^*$ ). In patriarchal families (in which decisions are always or more often made by the father), the father's influence was assessed to be higher ( $M = 2.62$ ) than in egalitarian ( $M = 2.31$ ) and matriarchal families ( $M = 1.94$ ). The analysis did not determine the significance of differences when it comes to the variables of settlement size and sex.

When asked directly who has decisively influenced their political views, almost half of the participants (44.8%) did not provide an answer. Among those who did, the most common answer was *parents* (16.6%), followed by *me, alone* (15.3%), *all others* (13.9%), and *no one* (9.5%). Thus, almost half of the participants who answered this question believe that the agents of socialization did not have any influence on the formation of their political attitudes. Consistent with the third hypothesis, the post-hoc test found that there are differences in the experience of the frequency of family discussions about politics with respect to determining the importance of individual agents ( $F_{(350)} = 6.237^{**}$ ). Participants who acknowledge the crucial importance of parents ( $M = 3.15$ ) are more likely to have family discussions about politics than those who acknowledge the crucial importance of other PS agents ( $M = 2.73$ ) and those who felt that no one has influenced their attitudes ( $M = 2.63$ ).

### *Participants' ideological self-identification (PIS) and the perceived parents' ideological orientation (PIO)*

The left-center-right ideological orientation scale, a standard measuring instrument in which the participants locate their place on the scale (Rico and Jennings, 2016),



**Figure 2.** Participants' ideological self-identification (in %)

was used as an indicator of the participants' and their parents' political attitudes. Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 204) point out that self-classification on a scale is a choice of label, a reduction of a complex reality to a simple concept associated with party preferences, party identification, political values, and the political behavior of individuals. Zuell and Scholz (2016) problematize the content validity of this scale and argue that the terms left and right evoke different associations in different countries.<sup>24</sup> Other authors (Čular, 1999) believe that the scale has proven its validity and reliability in recent decades, but that it should be borne in mind that it is not a consistent set of values or a consistent ideological image of the world.

Based on the small share of those who did not answer these questions, it can be concluded that the students feel familiar with the meaning of the terms left-center-right, which is not all that surprising given their constant presence in the Croatian media landscape.<sup>25</sup>

The distributions of the responses (Figure 2.) have the same unimodal curve shape with a more pronounced left side as in the parents. The largest part, almost half of the sample, placed themselves in the political center, and there were twice as many students in the three positions on the left (32.5%) than in the three positions on the right (16.7%).<sup>26</sup>

Regional differences are statistically significant but weakly related to differences in PIS ( $\chi^2 = 18.134^*$ ;  $df = 6$ ; Cramer's  $V = .126$ ). The majority of participants in the three regional categories were located in the center, with the exception of the students from Dalmatian counties, who were slightly more located on the ri-

<sup>24</sup> The authors also problematize the central point of the scale (0 = center) because they believe that positioning in the middle of the ideological range, in addition to choosing the option of a political center, can mean (1) concealing the answer *I do not know* and (2) the option *I can not decide*.

<sup>25</sup> Not providing an answer to this question is related to the variable *interest in politics* ( $\chi^2 = 72.468^*$ ;  $df = 9$ ; Cramer's  $V = .195$ ) because two-thirds of those who did not answer this question are not interested in politics at all, and an additional fifth is indecisive.

<sup>26</sup> The percentage of participants located in the center coincides with the distribution of IO determined at the national level (Sekulić, 2016; Ježovita, 2019). The higher share of participants located on the left than on the right in relation to the national level is a consequence of the higher representation of participants from the regions of Primorje and Istria in our sample, who are continuously more inclined towards center and center-left parties.

**Table 4.** Testing for IS differences with respect to sociodemographic variables

		N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
MOTHER'S EDUCATION (Scheffe)	1. Three-year high school	80	3.96	1.505	3	4.639*	1>3, 4 2>3, 4
	2. Four-year high school	282	3.88	1.468			
	3. College	85	3.38	1.345			
	4. University	130	3.48	1.474			
FAMILY CULTURAL CAPITAL (Tamhane)	1. Three-year high school	43	4.16	1.413	3	5.881**	1>3 2>3, 4
	2. Four-year high school	226	3.96	1.475			
	3. College	126	3.43	1.255			
	4. University	183	3.55	1.554			

ght than in the center (35.8%: 34.0%). The closest to the left are students from the Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Istria counties, of whom a slightly smaller percentage are located on the left (38.8%) than in the center (44.9%). The experience of war destruction also affects the difference in PIS ( $t = -3.362^{**}$ ). Students who grew up in war-stricken counties on average were placed in the center ( $M = 4.10$ ), while others were placed in the center but leaning to the left ( $M = 3.62$ ).<sup>27</sup>

A statistically significant correlation was found between the interest in politics and IS. The chi-square test ( $\chi^2 = 41.397^{**}$ ;  $df = 4$ ; Cramer's  $V = .188$ ) reveals that those participants who ranked themselves in the center admit the most that they are not interested in politics (62.6%) and the least that they are interested (14.8%). Significantly greater interest in politics is expressed by the "leftists" (37.9%) and "rightists" (34.6%). It should be further explored whether positioning in the center for the part of participants who *are not interested* in politics at all conceals the answer *I do not know* (Zuell and Scholz, 2016), or whether this is a matter of political conformism, a superficial answer whose meaning is to classify/shelter in the unproblematic lee of the social matrix?

Of the sociodemographic variables, statistically significant differences<sup>28</sup> in self-identification were found with respect to the mother's education and the family cultural capital (Table 4). On average, participants whose mothers have a college and university education tend to gravitate toward the left, while those whose mothers have a high school education are on average placed in the center. We find the same pattern concerning the variable *Family cultural capital*. On average, children of parents with secondary education are closer to the center, while those with college and university education are closer to the left.

In line with expectations emerging from the fourth hypothesis, there are very small differences in the assessment of their own and their parents' IO, and the sta-

<sup>27</sup> Elchardus and Spruyt (2009) present an intriguing idea of the differences in students' IO with respect to the scientific fields of study. This study did not identify statistically significant differences in IS between the students in the social, natural, and technical fields.

<sup>28</sup> Statistically, we find the strongest link of IS with the variables of religiosity because, with the increase in religiosity, the classification on the left decreases, and the one in the center and on the right increases. However, the analysis of this connection goes beyond the topic of this paper.



**Table 5.** Concordance between PIS and PIO (in %)

		BOTH PARENTS' IO			
		Left	Center	Right	Different
PARTICIPANTS' IO	Left	72.3	7.8	4.4	15.5
	Center	8.9	68.1	8.9	14.1
	Right	2.8	6.5	73.8	16.8

$\chi^2 = 544.477^{**}$ ;  $df = 6$ ; Cramer's  $V = .683$

tistical analysis reveals significant connections of one's own and the father's IO ( $\chi^2 = 468.048^{**}$ ;  $df = 4$ ; Cramer's  $V = .639$ ) and the mother's IO ( $\chi^2 = 490.095^{**}$ ;  $df = 4$ ; Cramer's  $V = .628$ ). The participants also perceive a very high ideological homogeneity (matching IOs) of their parents ( $\chi^2 = 658.594^{**}$ ;  $df = 4$ ; Cramer's  $V = .755$ ), with slightly more fathers gravitating toward the right and less toward the left than mothers. The range of matching IOs on the seven-point scale for each category is more than half and ranges from 51.4% to as much as 87.9%, and the highest match is found in the center and in the two extreme categories.

The relationship between PIS and the variable *Concordance of the parents' ideological orientation* (Table 5) can be viewed as an indirect indicator of the success of FIO transmission. It can be seen that more than two-thirds of the participants have placed themselves on the (abbreviated) IO scale, on the same side on which they placed their parents.

Previous research (Ilišin et al., 2013) found that more than two-thirds of young people (70.3%) believe that their political views to some extent (slightly, partially, or completely) agree with their parents' views. In this study, an almost identical percentage (70.5%) of participants placed themselves and both parents on the same side of the IO scale, which additionally supports the fourth hypothesis.

The chi-square test reveals ( $\chi^2 = 9.866^*$ ;  $df = 2$ ; Cramer's  $V = .130$ ) that the difference between one's own and the parents' IO is recognized more (39.4%) by the participants interested in politics than those who are indifferent (25.6%) and those disinterested in politics (26.1%). From the above, it can be concluded that greater interest in politics is associated with questioning the parents' political views and that a lower interest means a greater likelihood of adopting the parents' IO. According to the fifth hypothesis, the parents' authority in IO transmission ( $\chi^2 = 10.095^*$ ;  $df = 2$ ; Cramer's  $V = .132$ ) is less questioned by those who rate the relationship with the parents as extremely good (24.5%) than those who define it as good (34.8 %) and those who rate it as ambivalent (38.0%).

The distribution of results on the created variable *Concordance of FIO* shows that slightly less than a third of the participants place their parents and themselves in the political center (29.0%), a quarter on the left (23.5%), and one-eighth on the right (12.3%), while slightly more than a quarter of the participants (27.1%) consider having a different IO from their family. In the last category, there is an equal share of those who identify their IO with the mother's and those who identify it with the father's IO. Let us add that the pattern of gender socialization, according to which the son's IO would be more similar to the father's and the daughter's IO to the mother's, has not been confirmed.

By analyzing the distribution within certain categories, we find that equally high (almost three-quarters) concordance between their own and their parents' IO is perceived by those participants who are located on the right and left, and a slightly less concordance, but still more than two-thirds, by those who are located in the center (Table 5). The participants who do not perceive a concordance of FIO to a very small extent believe that family members have diametrically opposed IOs. When we swap PIS and PIO positions in the analysis, we obtain data on the extent to which the participants have accepted (perceived) PIO. The highest concordance has been found in the center (88.9%), slightly less on the left (84.7%), and even less on the right (70.5%). The twice as many participants who were socialized in families in which they perceive the PIO as right-wing "abandoned" their parents' perceived IO than those who perceive the family political climate as being left-oriented.<sup>29</sup> More frequent abandonment of the right PIO may be hypothetically explained with the thesis on the liberalizing effect of education (Hello et al., 2004). Research indicates that right-wing citizen of Croatia are more inclined towards conservative values, nationalism, gender conservatism, and a more negative attitude towards homosexuals (Sekulić, 2016), and that University of Rijeka students share more liberal worldviews from the student average (Ilišin, 2014).

Concordant FIO are statistically significantly related to the participants' interest in politics and the stimulating family political environment, which is in line with fifth hypothesis (Table 6). Families whose members are placed in the center of the IO scale differ from the others because their everyday environment is less tempered by politics, and political topics are less often the subject of discussion than in the remaining families. The observed difference should be further investigated because it is indicative that more than half of the participants (55.8%) who never discuss political topics in their families are located in the center. As the frequency of family political debates increases, the participants' self-classification in the center decreases, and it increases at the poles of the scale. The argument in favor of the claim that families belonging to the most widespread political orientation – ideological center are less politically stimulating is the fact that the participants from these families are less interested in politics than the participants from the families of the remaining IOs ( $\chi^2 = 47.315^{**}$ ;  $df = 6$ ; Cramer's  $V = .201$ ).

Participants who grew up in counties directly affected by war differ from those who did not have that experience in terms of the extent of concordance between FIO identity and the share of individual categories on the scale ( $\chi^2 = 23.648^{**}$ ;  $df = 3$ ; Cramer's  $V = .204$ ). Participants from war-stricken counties classify their FIO as being more on the right (21.5%) than on the left (12.3%), in contrast to counties unaffected by war (11.2%: 29.3%). The shift of the curve to the right on the scale of ideological orientation in the counties affected by war fits in with the findings of previous research on differences in ideological orientations in Croatian regions (Boneta, 2004). Interestingly, there is a difference ( $\chi^2 = 5.510^*$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $C = .098$ ) in the FIO concordance, which is smaller in the war-affected counties than in the remaining counties. Additional statistical analysis reveals that the participants from

<sup>29</sup> The thesis of Boehnke et al. (2007) that parental influence in PS is stronger in families whose political preferences deviate from the spirit of the time in a particular society has not been confirmed. In the Croatian case, it is reasonable to assume that we find a departure from the political spirit of the time in families that are outside the political center according to their IO. There are no statistically significant differences regarding IS and perceived POI between the three IO categories.

**Table 6.** Testing for differences in the concordance of the FIO with regards to the interest in politics and the frequency of family discussions about politics

Interest in politics <sup>30</sup>	N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
1. Left	149	2.87	1.172			
FAMILY IO (Tamhane)	184	2.05	.993	3	18.193**	2<1, 3, 4
3. Right	78	2.76	1.186			
4. Different	172	2.78	1.300			
Frequency of political discussions <sup>31</sup>	N	M	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
1. Left	149	2.99	.788			
FAMILY IO (Tamhane)	184	2.49	.887	3	12.530**	2<1, 3, 4
3. Right	78	3.00	.721			
4. Different	172	2.90	.905			

war-stricken counties, in relation to their parents, have moved significantly towards the center and the left, and very little towards the right.<sup>32</sup> It seems plausible to assume that this shift can, at least in part, be explained as a consequence of the liberalizing effect of education (Hello et al., 2004).

Our research also confirmed previous research findings (Ilišin, 2014) that students from the Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar County are more inclined to the left political option than students from other parts of Croatia. However, it should be added that University of Rijeka students from other parts of Croatia, with the exception of those from Dalmatian counties, are placed more on the left than on the right side of the scale. The analyses did not identify statistically significant differences in the matching of PIS and PIO with respect to the *participants' sex, settlement size, and key family decision-making dynamics*.

### *Assessed agent impact and concordance of PIS and PIO*

A connection was found between assessment of the agent's impact on political attitudes and the participants' position on the IO scale. Those participants who aligned themselves on the left and on the right admit a somewhat stronger, albeit still small, influence of their parents and friends than those who ranked themselves in the center (Table 7). In the most numerous category, the participants who have settled in the political center, less than others, acknowledge the influence of all agents on the

<sup>30</sup> How interested are you in politics? Answer categories: 1 = not interested at all; 2 = mostly not interested; 3 = neither interested nor uninterested; 4 = mostly interested; 5 = extremely interested.

<sup>31</sup> How often do you discuss politics in your family? Answer categories: 1 = never; 2 = very rarely; 3 = occasionally; 4 = often; 5 = constantly.

<sup>32</sup> The chi square ( $\chi^2 = 100.604^{**}$ ;  $df = 6$ ; Cramer's  $V = .622$ ) reveals that a quarter of children (23.8%) from right-wing families moved to the center and a tenth (9.5%) to the left. Half (48.1%) of children from ideologically inhomogeneous families were located in the center, a third on the left (37.0%), and only one in seven on the right (14.8). The majority (92.5%) of children from center-leaning family remained in the center, and a quarter (23.8%) of children from the "left" settled in the center, and all the rest "remained" on the left.

**Table 7.** ANOVA – differences in the assessment of the impact on political attitudes with respect to PIS

		N	M <sup>34</sup>	SD	df	F	Post-hoc
MOTHER (Tamhane)	1. Left	206	2.38	1.162			
	2. Center	269	1.85	.977	2	21.578**	2<1, 3,
	3. Right	107	2.52	1.144			
FATHER (Scheffe)	1. Left	206	2.49	1.151			
	2. Center	267	1.96	1.068	2	25.755**	2<1, 3
	3. Right	107	2.81	1.245			
OTHER RELATIVES (Tamhane)	1. Left	187	1.67	.982			
	2. Center	253	1.56	.918	2	7.435*	1, 2<3
	3. Right	98	2.02	1.227			
BEST FRIEND (Tamhane)	1. Left	206	1.79	.968			
	2. Center	268	1.55	.849	2	5.577*	2<1, 3
	3. Right	107	1.82	.969			
PEER GROUP (Scheffe)	1. Left	206	1.91	1.046			
	2. Center	269	1.62	.858	2	6.830*	2<1, 3
	3. Right	107	1.91	.937			

formation of their political views.<sup>33</sup> The only deviation from this pattern is found in the influence of the extended family, whose influence is acknowledged by more participants leaning to the right than those in the center and on the left. The hypothetical cause of this deviation could be found in the difference in attitudes about family and marriage between the left and the right. Sekulić (2016) finds that those oriented to the right are more inclined to conservative attitudes, which highly value the patriarchal family, and thus kinship authority.<sup>34</sup>

Of the socioeconomic variables, a statistically significant relationship was found between gender and the assessment of the crucial agent ( $\chi^2 = 11.722^*$ ;  $df = 3$ ; Cramer's  $V = .184$ ). Male students more often deny the role of all analyzed agents (55.9%) than female students (38.2%). At the same time, female students acknowledge the greater importance of the family (35.0%) in shaping their political attitudes than male students (21.3%). The causes of these sex differences, which should certainly be further investigated, are probably found in the characteristics of dominant femininity and masculinity manifestly present in gender socialization in Croatian society. Traditional gender discourse ascribes to the man the engagement in the public sphere, while it places the woman in the private, family sphere. Despite visible modernization changes in value attitudes about gender equality (Sekulić, 2012), research reveals that changes in the direction of egalitarianism occur more on a declarative than practical level (Galić, Buzov, and Bandalović, 2009).

<sup>33</sup> For example, the chi-square reveals that twice as many participants from the center (47.2%) as those from the left (24.8%) and the right (21.5%) claim that their fathers did not influence their political views at all.

<sup>34</sup> Answer categories: 1 = none; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = a lot; 5 = extremely much

**Table 8.** FIO and the assessment of the decisive influence on political attitudes (in %)

	Family	Me	No one	Someone else
Left	43.6	15.4	14.1	26.9
Center	22.0	34.0	22.0	22.0
Right	43.8	20.8	12.5	22.9
Different	23.8	35.2	13.3	27.6

$\chi^2 = 23.555^*$ ;  $df = 9$ ; Cramer's  $V = .154$

Contrary to the third hypothesis, the assessment of the quality of relationships with parents did not prove to be statistically significant with regards to the response about the parents' decisive influence on political attitudes. Neither did those participants who assessed their relationship with the parents as ambivalent perceive the parents as less crucial agents, nor did those who assessed this relationship as extremely good diminish their own influence on the formation of these attitudes.

The existence of an association was established between the assessment of the FIO and the assessment of the decisive influence on the formation of political attitudes (Table 8). Slightly less than half of the participants who classified themselves and their parents on the left or on the right believe that the family had a decisive influence on their attitudes. In contrast, most participants from "centrist families" and those without IO concordance claimed to have been autonomous in shaping their political position. Participants from families in which there is no harmony in IO in the PS period did not have harmonious ideological orientations, so they had to define their ideological position more independently. In contrast, the response of participants from harmonious "centrist" families is unexpected and its background should be further explored. Hypothetically, it is possible that this is an attempt to reconcile two opposing tendencies encountered by young people in late modernity. On the one hand, the imperative of active management of one's own life (Beck and Beck-Gersheim, 2002), which includes the aspiration for uniqueness and independence, and, on the other hand, the self-classification into a more represented position of the political center (mainstream). In order to give at least the appearance of autonomy in self-reflection, external influences are denied and self-sufficiency is emphasized in creating the property of a political biography.

## Conclusion

For a long time, the PS analysis was based on assumptions about (1) child/youth passivity and (2) children's knowledge about their parents' political views. The occurrence of a generational mismatch was interpreted either (1) as a result of a failed transmission and/or (2) a consequence of a change in the social context. Newer approaches to PS emphasize a more active role of children/youth in shaping their own worldview. The results of this research support this thesis by finding a broad belief in students that they have autonomously devised their political views. Students deny the influence of external PS agents and only acknowledge a very weak influence of their parents, both mother and father. The influence of an individual parent is related to sociodemographic characteristics and family relationships. The mother's influence grows with her education level, while the father's influence is greater in families with a patriarchal distribution of power. The father's role is greater when

the participants rate the relationship with him as good, and the mother's influence grows when the relationship with the father is assessed as poor. The participants who grew up in a politically stimulating home environment in which politics was more frequently discussed acknowledge the somewhat greater influence of parents on their political attitudes. In contrast to this and findings from previous research (Boehnke et al., 2007; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015), parents' political homogeneity has not been shown to influence the assessment of parents' influence.

The assessment of weak parental influence on political attitudes is inconsistent with the high level of parental and intergenerational IO concordance. First of all, eight out of ten participants place both parents in the same position on the three-category (left-center-right) IO scale, suggesting that the primary PS process was not marked by conflicting information. Furthermore, seven out of ten participants place themselves and both parents in the same position on the IO scale, suggesting a successful family transmission of political views. Nevertheless, a significant part of the participants believes that their political views are the result of independent choice, from which it can be concluded that the idea of do-it-yourself political biographies is present among the participants. Most participants believe that the analyzed informal and formal PS agents did not strongly influence the formation of their political views. Despite underestimating and even denying the importance of family PS, a great similarity between the participants' and their parents' IO supports the theory of social learning. However, the above mentioned can only be valid in the informal PS context, as the influence of primary and high school teachers (formal PS agents) was assessed as negligible.

The denial of the importance of informal and formal PS agents indicates an extended late modernity individualistic paradigm among the surveyed students. Emphasizing one's own role in the PS process fits into the theory of lifelong openness, but a small deviation from the parents' IO does not support the justification of such a conclusion. Although this contradiction needs to be further investigated, it seems justified to consider the applicability of the hypothesis about the relationship between the social environment and the PS for its explanation. Namely, according to this hypothesis, it is possible to assume that the process of the re-traditionalization of Croatian society contributes to the high concordance of the participants' and their parents' IOs and that the opposite process of individualization contributes to the participants' simultaneous denial of the influence of external agents on their PS.

Interestingly, most participants placed themselves and their parents in the center of the IO scale. In the case of conflicting parental IOs (one on the left and the other on the right), most participants do not align with one of the parents but place themselves in the center of the scale.

In contrast, participants from families in which political topics are more often the subject of discussion and those who show a greater interest in politics are more often placed outside the political center on the IO scale. Interestingly, students interested in politics are at the forefront of assessing that their IO differs from their parents' IOs. Thus, socialized participants in a politically stimulating environment are more likely to move away from the political center and from their parents' IOs. It is also noticeable that the participants who observe the difference between their own and their parents' IOs placed themselves higher to the left on the scale than their parents. Therefore, it sounds paradoxical that the autonomously constructed political attitudes are more often than the average advocated by the participants who are positioned in the center of the scale. The reasons for emphasizing one's own role

in building political attitudes, which is intriguing, especially in the most numerous category of the political center, should be further investigated. Hypothetically, this may be an attempt to rehabilitate credibility in one's own eyes because of an awareness of the discrepancy between the accepted late modernity idea of a "do it yourself biography" that implies the authenticity of the individual and belonging to the most widespread political orientation category.

Finally, the limitations of this paper should be emphasized, which, in data collection, relied on two methods that can detect weak points. The first method is the participants' assessment of their parents' IO, in which there is a possibility of misjudgment, regardless of whether they want to identify with the parents or want to distance themselves from them. Nevertheless, we believe that, in the context of ideological divisions and conflicts in Croatian society, this assessment has value because it implicitly indicates the participants' perception of IO transmission. Another problem is the application of the retrospective method in the participants' assessment of the influence of different agents on their own political attitudes. Jaspers, Lubbers, and De Graaf (2009) believe that data obtained with the retrospective method should be used with great caution because people tend to adapt memory to their current attitudes and align them with social changes that have occurred in the meantime. Finally, it should be pointed out that our sample is dominated by participants from Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar counties; therefore, the results cannot be generalized to the student population of the whole of Croatia.

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## **Pada li jabuka daleko od stabla? Agensi socijalizacije ideologijske orijentacije studenata**

**Sažetak** U radu su predstavljeni rezultati terenskog istraživanja procjene utjecaja neformalnih i formalnih agensa procesa političke socijalizacije na uzorku studenata Sveučilišta u Rijeci (N=635). Analizirana je povezanost ideologijske samoidentifikacije ispitanika i procijenjene ideologijske orijentacije roditelja. Studenti smatraju da nijedan agens socijalizacije nije čak ni osrednje utjecao na oblikovanje njihovih političkih stavova, a najslabijim ocjenjuju utjecaj agensa formalne političke socijalizacije – nastavnika u osnovnoj i srednjoj školi. Ispitanici smatraju da su roditelji više od ostalih agensa utjecali na njihove političke stavove, ali taj utjecaj u prosjeku ocjenjuju slabim, neovisno o tome smještaju li roditelje na istu ili različite pozicije na skali ideologijske orijentacije. Ispitanici koji su se svrstali na ljevicu i na desnicu priznaju nešto snažniji utjecaj roditeljske neformalne političke socijalizacije od onih koji su se svrstali u centar. Utvrđene su statistički značajne veze između ideologijske samoidentifikacije ispitanika i procijenjene ideologijske orijentacije roditelja. Mali je udio ispitanika koji ne percipiraju postojanje vlastitog i roditeljskog suglasja u ideologijskoj orijentaciji, a zanemariv je udio onih koji svoje roditelje smještaju na dijametralne pozicije skale. Ispitanici koji imaju veći interes za politiku, ali i oni iz politički stimulativnijeg okruženja, skloniji su odmaknuti se od političkog centra, kao i od ideologijske orijentacije svojih roditelja. Obiteljsko podudaranje ideologijske orijentacije raste percepcijom kvalitetnijih odnosa s roditeljima.

**Ključne riječi** politička socijalizacija, agensi socijalizacije, ideologijske orijentacije, studenti

### **Kako citirati članak / How to cite this article:**

Boneta Ž., and Mrakovčić, M. (2021). Does the Apple Fall Far from the Tree? Agents of Socialization of Students' Ideological Orientations. *Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva*, 18(1), 55-80. <https://doi.org/10.20901/an.18.09>