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## Yugoslavs and Europeans Compared: Supranational Polities and Supranational Identification<sup>1</sup>

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### *Summary*

Drawing on Sekulić, Massey and Hodson's seminal article 'Who were the Yugoslavs?', this paper compares the share and determinants of identifying as Yugoslavs during socialism with the panorama of primary European identification. Eurobarometer surveys containing data on European identification are utilized to that end. The study takes in consideration social and political contexts that shaped supranational identification in particular Yugoslav socialist republics and EU member states. Our findings show low levels of Europeans and Yugoslavs in both polities. The results also show that nationally specific contexts affect both the prevalence of European identification and its determinants. There are considerable differences in the level of European identification among EU countries, and statistical analyses of the Belgian, French and German cases further showed that different factors shape it. Of all the variables, non-exclusive nationalities have been the strongest predictors of supranational identification in both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU.

*Keywords:* European Union, Socialist Yugoslavia, Identification, Supranationalism, Member States, Republics

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## Introduction

Popular support for supranational polities and the resilience of these polities could be, among other measures, discerned from the high number of individuals who have primarily identified themselves supranationally. For instance, American identity as primary identity has been highly accepted among whites and is a primary identity for large shares of racial minorities in the US (Schildkraut, 2010). Compared to the US, Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU had and have low levels of primary identification with their supranational polities.<sup>2</sup> However, both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU developed non-negligible levels of primary supranational identification, despite neither polity openly promoting this sort of identification. For instance, in the 1981 Socialist Yugoslavia census, 1.2 million citizens declared themselves as Yugoslavs, which was twice the number of the whole population of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro. On the other hand, EU member states such as Belgium and Luxembourg have around one fifth and one quarter of citizens, respectively, who declare themselves as primarily European. These numbers should not be underestimated, as these contingents can be seen as the source of calls for deeper integration and potential (supra)nation-building.

The main difference between these two supranational identifications was in the sequences of attempts of supranation-building and the connotations it brought. Socialist Yugoslavia engaged in soft nation-building (proposals for unified language, promotion of Yugoslav socialist nation) during the 1950s, but abandoned it in the 1960s (Ivešić, 2020). On the other hand, only with the relaunch of European integration during the mid-1980s came projects (Schengen Agreement, Erasmus) which were building foundations for supranational European identification. This difference stemmed from the main difference between these two systems, namely that Socialist Yugoslavia was developing from the centralized Stalinist state of the early post-war years towards a heavily decentralized system, symbolized in the 1974 constitution. On the other hand, European integration had a reversed trajectory from the economic community towards confederacy with several federal elements. However, in both cases, openly promoting supranational identification was hindered by accusations of secretly introducing unitarism (i.e. Serbian hegemony) in Socialist

<sup>2</sup> Comparison with the US is one that is most often made when the EU is compared with other polities (for the most recent comparisons, see McNamara and Musgrave, 2020; Parsons, Matthijs and Springer, 2021). However, the US was rather successful in building a national identity out of numerous ethnic groups, some of them also having a strong national identity. Therefore, a comparison with a polity which failed to build supranational identity is called for. Also, Socialist Yugoslavia was the only case of a bigger number of already developed European nations (Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, Montenegrin) creating a federal state in the post-World War II period, which makes it the most comparable case to the EU.

Yugoslavia or federalism in the EU as a menace to nation-states' sovereignty and even of erasing national identities. In socialist Yugoslavia this had more serious connotations as the state was built as an opposition to monarchist Yugoslavia of the interwar period which was ruled by Serbian monarchs.

Both examples of supranational identification show that some citizens of Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU have changed their primary identification (they either abandoned or accepted supranational identification) in the course of a decade. This implies that their national and supranational identification was under the influence of social and political changes on both national and supranational levels. Drawing on Sekulić, Massey and Hodson's (1994) seminal article 'Who Were the Yugoslavs?', this paper compares the share and determinants of identifying as Yugoslav citizens during socialism with the panorama of primary European identification. Eurobarometer (EB) surveys containing data on European identification are utilized to that end. The study takes in consideration social and political contexts that shaped supranational identification in particular Yugoslav socialist republics and EU member states. Our research indicates that both supranational polities reluctantly created categories, which allowed their citizens to identify supranationally. Having non-exclusive nationality was the best predictor of supranational identification in both cases. However, the EU as a politically more plural polity allowed for more different ways of identifying supranationally than in the case of Socialist Yugoslavia. We conclude with the implications of supranational identification for the future of the EU from a comparative perspective.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This paper deals with the issue of changes in the presence of supranational identification through time and with the determinants of this identification on both supranational polity level and in different national contexts. Although one can lately find much talk about identity – and especially European identity – in public and scientific discourses, we concur with authors who warn that the very notion of identity has become ambiguous, abused and an analytically poorly usable “tool” for social research (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Brubaker, 2004; Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Sekulić, 2007; Malešević, 2006). More precisely, “conceptualizing all affinities and affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of commonality, connectedness, and cohesion, all self-understandings and self-identifications in the idiom of ‘identity’ saddles us with a blunt, flat, undifferentiated vocabulary” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 2). For the above reasons, Brubaker and Cooper suggest that the notion of identity should be replaced by clusters of other less ambiguous and more differentiated notions such as identification and categorization, self-understanding and social location, commonality, connectedness and groupness. They believe that

the mentioned terms can contribute more to conceptual and theoretical analysis of social reality because they are not burdened with essentialist connotations and multiple meanings like the term identity (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Particularly, the study of supranational identification, which is in constant struggle with exclusive nationalist identification, calls for a more nuanced approach.

For example, the notion of identification makes it possible to specify the agents that generate this process. The notion of categorization makes it possible to observe that the state, institutions, social movements, influential social actors and cultural or political entrepreneurs can be powerful identifiers in society, because they can create categories and classifications through which people can self-identify or be identified by other people or institutions (*ibid.*, pp. 14-17). This is particularly visible in large-scale top-down projects dealing with identification: national population censuses, but also surveys done by political institutions such as the European Commission in the case of EB. Both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU authorities, although cautiously and gradually, introduced supranational identification in national census and regular public opinion surveys, respectively. Had they not done so, the talk of supranational identities would have stayed confined in academic circles. Thus, they facilitated self-understanding and social positioning of individuals who did not easily identify with member states/republics in which they lived. However, Brubaker and Cooper warn that even the state, as one of the most powerful agents, will not always be successful in creating the internal sameness or in leading to groupness and collective mobilization or action (*ibid.*, p. 14).

According to Brubaker and Cooper, the term self-understanding “is a dispositional term that designates what might be called ‘situated subjectivity’: one’s sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and of how (given the first two) one is prepared to act” (*ibid.*, p. 17). Focusing on these two parameters, potential directions in which actors will be willing to act in the context of different social situations can be analyzed and determined (*ibid.*, pp. 17-19). During the social, economic and political crises, actors who identify themselves supranationally could be more willing to mobilise in “protecting” and supporting their supranational polities. This happened with new political parties and movements promoting Yugoslavness/Europeanness during the crises of Socialist Yugoslavia/the EU, which we mention below. “‘Commonality’ denotes the sharing of some common attribute, ‘connectedness’ the relational ties that link people... (and) groupness (the sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded, solidarity group)” (*ibid.*, p. 20). When commonality and connectedness are linked together, they can generate groupness in social life. Finally, Brubaker emphasizes that the effects of political entrepreneurs and categorization on identification, self-understanding and social location of different people and their potential groupness can be answered only through the findings of empirical research (Brubaker, 2004, p. 54).

We believe the aforementioned analytical vocabulary can enable the analysis of the dynamics of supranational identification and (dis)integration as a result of the interplay between formally institutionalized and codified categorizations of the social world, action of social entrepreneurs, and the perception and action of the wider public. Their identification and self-understanding can be significantly influenced by entrepreneurs. Also “the power of events to influence collective identity genesis and change” was emphasized in the research on European identity in national contexts, for instance in the case of the economic crisis in Greece (Westle and Segatti, 2016, p. 6).

### **Changing Meanings of Yugoslavism and Europeanism**

Yugoslavism as an ideology of uniting South Slavic ethnic groups had different meanings throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century history of Southeastern Europe. It was conceived in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century as a project of liberating South Slavic people from Austro-Hungarian dominance. The project regularly encompassed Croats and Serbs, often Slovenians, and occasionally Bulgarians. After the formation of a joint Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian state in 1918 (the first or monarchist Yugoslavia), Croats, Serbs, and Slovenians were treated as tribes of one nation. In 1929 king Alexander introduced royal dictatorship and attempted to forge a Yugoslav nation from above. This brought the resistance of nationalist forces and Alexander’s assassination in 1934. By the end of monarchist Yugoslavia, Yugoslavism was primarily perceived as the idea of authoritarian and conservative Serbian elites (Dugandžija, 1985; Troch, 2010). Precisely because of this image, Yugoslavism was not openly promoted in socialist Yugoslavia. As Haug (2012) demonstrated, contrary to popular opinion, national ideologies remained important and national questions were far from resolved throughout four decades of the socialist regime. Espousing national identity as primary identification was promoted by the regime. However, the regime flirted with Yugoslavism through proposals for unified language and promotion of Yugoslav socialist nation until the early 1960s (Ivešić, 2020). The changing narrative of the Yugoslav authoritarian leader Josip Broz Tito is indicative here. Also in the mid-1960s, Tito switched from his previous emphasis on being Yugoslav to proclaiming to be a Croat (Marković, 2001).

However, the notion of “partisan Yugoslavism” remained important, particularly during the crisis-ridden 1980s, as “to identify as a Yugoslav was to condemn the forces that betrayed the memory of the war and to identify with the efforts of the Partisans to create a progressive, socialist society” (Sekulić, Massey and Hodson, 1994, p. 85). Several movements and institutions were carriers of Yugoslavism, albeit with different emphasis. Radical left intellectuals around the journal *Praxis* were staunchly anti-nationalist and pro-Yugoslav. They were often accused of unitarism by leading communists and the journal ceased publishing in 1974, due to the

lack of funding. The pop-rock scene of the mid 1980s also got engaged in partisan Yugoslavism (1984 and 1985 albums of the biggest Yugoslav rock band Bijelo dugme initiated this trend) and paradoxically combined it with liberal Western lifestyles. Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), its name indicating a strong connection with the Yugoslav people, was the most influential institution in preserving the Yugoslav identity and identification. This was particularly visible while the Communist Party was becoming heavily decentralized and Tito died in 1980. As the state was disintegrating and multiparty elections were introduced, all of these pro-Yugoslav milieus founded or supported political parties promoting their visions of Yugoslavism. Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (UJDI) was the first party formed in 1989 by former *Praxis* intellectuals and Predrag Matvejević, who wrote a book promoting Yugoslavism (1982). UJDI put emphasis on introducing democracy and saving Yugoslavia. YPA generals founded the party League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia, which wanted to preserve Yugoslav socialism even by the use of violence. The most electorally successful pro-Yugoslav political group The Union of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia led by Prime Minister Ante Marković and oriented towards liberal reforms was supported by rock and film stars, but was not able to successfully challenge nationalist parties (see Orlić, 2011; Filipović, 2021).

Forces of industrialization and urbanization were conducive to the rise of Yugoslavs as they pulled some rural people away from their religious and national communities. Ethnically mixed marriages were also more common in urban than in rural settings. Although the overall share of ethnically mixed marriages was relatively low and did not change much from 1962 to 1989 (12,7% to 13%), it espoused different tendencies in various parts of Yugoslavia. In the same period the share of ethnically mixed marriages grew in the most developed constituent parts (autonomous province of Vojvodina, Slovenia, Croatia), but fell by half in the least developed (autonomous province of Kosovo, Macedonia) (Botev, 1994, p. 469). Kukic showed that “intermarriage is a key channel through which ethnic diversity influenced Yugoslav identity” (Kukic, 2019, p. 29).

Contrary to the Yugoslav case, the European idea prior to World War II was not primarily impregnated with authoritarian tendencies. Europe lacked state-like structure which could impose one vision of Europeaness and in the 1930s various ideas of Europe flourished: from left-wing British federalism, Hayek's liberal federalism to Coudenhove-Kalegri's conservative pan-Europeanism. However, the end of the 1930s and the 1940s were dominated by Hitler's idea of racially pure Europe fighting against the Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy. This idea of Europe brought destruction to the whole continent. After WWII carriers of other ideas of Europe saw the unification of Europe as the only way of saving the continent. Throughout the 1950s institutions which are the cornerstones of today's EU were built. The talk of European identity intensified with the 1973 Declaration on European Identity and

Eurobarometer got its name and current shape in 1973 and 1974 respectively. Particularly during the 1980s with the relaunch of European integration and the goal of creating a single market, European institutions got heavily interested in questions of identity i.e. supranation-building. The Adonnino Committee established in 1984 “aimed at creating new symbols for ‘Europeanness’ – which included a new logo, flag and anthem for Europe, and the standardized European passport” (Shore, 2004, p. 28).<sup>3</sup> Hansen (2000) pointed out that European citizenship was conceived with middle and higher classes in mind. The 1986 European Commission document demonstrated this as it singled out “architects, engineers, lawyers, accountants and tax consultants as groups that need certain obstacles removed when they seek jobs outside their countries” (*ibid.*, p. 144). With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty the European Union and European citizenship were established and every citizen of a member state became a citizen of the EU. EB followed the changes in political context and included the question which gave respondents the chance to identify as primarily and only European, however with a caveat “*in the near future*” added.<sup>4</sup> According to Dalton (2021, p. 342), these differences in phrasing reflect underlying conceptualizations of identities. The 1992 question is built on the premise of political identities being inclusive rather than exclusive, i.e. on the idea that national identities and a European one could coexist.

Another dimension of European identification relates to political ideologies, which were defining the EU project. Since the mid-1980s European integration was being increasingly politicized and the main cleavages were between those who supported the neoliberal project (Margaret Thatcher) and those who supported regulated capitalism (Jacques Delors) on the one hand and between nationalists and supranationalists on the other hand (Hooghe and Marks, 1997). With the success of the EU (introduction of Euro, Eastern enlargement), its supporters have increasingly defined it by anti-nationalist and progressive (green, social-democratic, human rights oriented) ideologies (McCormick, 2010; Petrović, 2016). However, multiple EU crises and particularly the migration crisis of 2015 have brought more intensive polarization within the EU and an emergence of a transnational-national cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). As a reaction to crises and due to the growing fear of EU disintegration, particularly after the Brexit referendum, various supranational political movements emerged. Actors who identify as primary European had prominent roles

<sup>3</sup> Officials involved in this project even aimed at the most important symbol of national identities, as they planned that the European athletes be represented by the European flag in Olympic Games medal ceremonies (Shore, 2004).

<sup>4</sup> Prior to this, the question of European identification was, in 1982, phrased as being an additional and occasional identification: “Do you ever think of yourself not only as (nationality) citizen, but also as a citizen of Europe? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?”



in newly founded pan-European parties such as the radical left DiEM25 and the centre-left Volt.<sup>5</sup> This indicated, as in the Yugoslav case, that following Brubaker's concepts, self-identification and collective action could generate groupness.

Sociological research showed that some citizens of the EU were not any longer confined within national boundaries and had fully transnational lives. Favell (2008, p. 239) saw highly mobile and educated individuals living in cosmopolitan cities as "'ideal types' of intra-EU migration" and named them Eurostars. Díez Medrano (2020), on the other hand, focused on European binational couples and saw them as "core cells of a future European society". Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz (2012, p. 119) argued that there are two sets of EU citizens. One set of EU citizens are blue-collar and service workers who see the EU as an elite project and immigration as a threat. The other set of Europeans are "educated people and those with high-status occupations... more likely to become at least partly Europeans, but there are not enough of them to have a large effect on creating a mass 'European identity'". Kohli (2000) also emphasized people living in border regions and belonging to diasporas as potential carriers of European identity.

Public opinion surveys seemingly show that a significantly smaller number of EU citizens identifies primarily as Europeans, compared to identifying as members of their nations (Carey, 2002; Clark and Rohrschneider, 2021). Furthermore, the debate on European identity faces an important challenge, as it is not entirely clear what the concept refers to in a theoretical and conceptual sense. Does it refer to "a collective identity, a variety of interlinking collective identities, an aggregation of personal identities, a broadly defined cultural category or civilizational idea, or an official EU cultural or political identity" (Delanty and Rumford, 2005, p. 50)? Various dimensions of European identity are also emphasized by some researchers, who claim that this issue has not been conceptualized and measured extensively enough (Westle and Segatti, 2016; Dalton, 2021).

Even though, as it would seem, there are no definitive answers on whether a European identity exists or not and what it represents today, it might be useful to analyze who are the citizens of the EU who self-identify as Europeans in public opinion research. That is, it seems that it would be useful for the debate's sake to investigate which socio-demographic, attitudinal and political characteristics are related to the self-identification of EU citizens primarily as Europeans. Espousing post-materialist values has been connected with higher European identification (Duchesne and Frogner, 1994). Drawing on the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) dimension of political values (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002), we assume that the current

<sup>5</sup> Based on desk research and interviews with young leaders and members of Volt and DiEM25, who belong to the "Erasmus generation" and often reject their national identities.

post-materialist value frame includes both concern for climate change and lack of concern for immigration. Schilde (2013) showed that not belonging to a titular nation has strong explanatory power for higher European identification.

## Data and Methods

In official Socialist Yugoslavia statistics, the category of identifying as a Yugoslav can be followed since the 1961 census. However, in 1961 the category ‘Yugoslav nationally undecided’ was used as a residual category for those who were nationally undeclared, and it encompassed Muslims (prior to their 1971 recognition as a distinct nationality) and various regional identifications. In 1971 Muslims were recognized as a distinct nationality and ‘Yugoslav nationally undecided’ became a category only for those who felt as Yugoslavs (Statistički godišnjak, 1991; Sekulić, Massey and Hodson, 1994; Mrdjen, 2002). However, the authorities were reluctant to support supranational identification even in the 1981 census which brought the surge of Yugoslavs and they remained treated as nationally undeclared, i.e. as some kind of aberration.<sup>6</sup> The 1991 census had the same questionnaire in all republics, but the results were differently presented, reflecting various politics of nationality that new regimes in each republic promoted (Mrdjen, 2002, p. 91). The introduction of new categories and reinterpretation of old ones in Yugoslav censuses allowed some people to socially position themselves anew and facilitated their self-understanding, as assumed by Brubaker’s conceptual framework. Although the EU as a polity does not have official censuses, EB surveys have rather regularly measured European identification using the so-called Moreno question. We descriptively track this data from four EBs dating from 1992 (37.0), 2002 (57.1), 2012 (77.4) and 2018 (90.3). For statistical analysis, however, we only utilize the most recent EB (2018). Data from all of the used EBs was weighted in order to correct sampling bias. When observing single countries, we used the post-stratification weight named ‘weight result from target’. When we looked at groups of member states (e.g. EU-28), we used the supplied group weights.

Aside from data selection, our research also necessitated case selection. Sekulić, Massey and Hodson analysed factors influencing Yugoslav self-identification in Serbia and Croatia (two most populated republics) and Bosnia and Her-

<sup>6</sup> Reluctance to this sort of identification and the fear of being branded as unitarist was still clear from the 1981 explanation for census collectors: “If a citizen wants to have Yugoslav written as an answer to this question, a collector is obliged to enter this answer, although a citizen does not thereby declare their nationality, or ethnicity” (cited in Dugandžija, 1985, p. 66). Dugandžija concluded that it was paradoxical that Yugoslavs were treated as undecided as they were the ones that had to make a decision regarding their nationality, while others were predominantly born into their national communities (*ibid.*, pp. 65-66).

zegovina (the only republic with no titular nation). Our selected EU member states loosely comparable to these Yugoslav republics are the two most populated states, which have also been the most prominent actors of European conflicts and politics (Germany and France) and the multinational Belgium. Belgium also has no titular nation and has a special status in the supranational imaginary of the EU as Bosnia and Herzegovina had in Socialist Yugoslavia (van Stapel, 1996).

Regarding the key, dependent variable (DV) of the research, we transformed the four-category EB scale of European identification by combining the ‘nationality only’ and ‘nationality and European’ responses into the ‘nationality first’ category, and by combining the ‘European only’ and ‘European and nationality’ responses into the ‘European first’ category (see Schilde, 2013). This left us with a dichotomous dependent variable, meaning that binary logistic regression is the appropriate statistical method for investigating relations with other variables. It should be pointed out that the DV was measured slightly differently throughout the years. From 1992 to 2013 the survey asked how respondents would see themselves *in the near future*, as opposed to asking them what they identify with in the present.<sup>7</sup> As for our selection of independent variables, we tried to build on Sekulić, Massey and Hodson’s research, all the while bringing in some new variables we considered relevant for exploring European identification. Instead of the two variables used in the Yugoslav case that measured nationally-mixed parentage and majority/minority status in constituent republics and provinces, we constructed the variable of non-exclusive nationality.<sup>8</sup> Non-conclusive answers<sup>9</sup> were treated as a missing value on all variables since otherwise those values skew the means. We used binary logistic regression. Two analyses were done, one covering the EU-28 states and the other covering three cases – Belgium, France, Germany. Although the former analysis cannot make a strong contribution to conclusions due to issues with doing statistics on large samples, we nonetheless tested it first in order to gauge indicative findings on the EU level. Analysis was done in SPSS (version 26). Finally, it should be pointed out that our goal is not to create a universally-applicable statistical model predicting European identification, but rather to test if specific variables have predictive power in different national contexts.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer-data-service/search-data-access/eb-trends-trend-files/list-of-trends/europ-identity>

<sup>8</sup> This variable also indicated potentially divided loyalty whether because of multiple citizenship or due to not having citizenship of the country in which the respondent resides. It should be noted that some of the EU member states did not allow or restrict dual citizenship (<https://corpocrat.com/2016/10/06/dualmultiple-citizenship-which-countries-permit-dual-citizenship/>).

<sup>9</sup> This includes answers: “Don’t know”, “Refusal”, “Inappropriate (consent not given)”.

<sup>10</sup> Despite this, we do provide pseudo R<sup>2</sup> values in order to gauge model fit between countries.

**Table 1.** Variables Used and Their Scale/Categories

Variables	Type	Scale/categories	Average score/percentage
<i>Primary European identification (DV)</i>	Dummy	<i>National identification primary (0); European identification primary (1)</i>	0: 89.8% (f = 23 637) 1: 8.7% (f = 2 380)
Urban residence	Categorical	Rural area or village (1); Small/middle town (2); Large town (3)	M = 1.94 SD = 0.785
Age spent in education	Continuous	-	M = 19.79 SD = 5.789
Frequency of discussing EU matters	Categorical	Frequently (1); Occasionally (2); Never (3)	M = 2.17 SD = 0.644
Immigration as an important EU issue	Dummy	Not mentioned (0); Mentioned (1)	0: 56.1% (f = 15 372) 1: 43.9% (f = 12 052)
Climate change as an important EU issue	Dummy	Not mentioned (0); Mentioned (1)	0: 83.5% (f = 22 896) 1: 16.5% (f = 4528)
Centrism	Dummy	Centrist (1); Non-centrist (0)	0: 26.1% (f = 7 154) 1: 48.4% (f = 13 275)
Age	Continuous	-	M = 48.14 SD = 18.695
Sex	Dummy	Man (0); Woman (1)	0: 48.0% (f = 13 163) 1: 52.0% (f = 14 261)
Social class (self-assessment)	Categorical	The working class of society (1); The lower middle class of society (2); The middle class of society (3); The upper middle class of society (4); The higher class of society (5)	M = 2.38 SD = 0.984
Non-exclusive nationality	Dummy	Exclusive nationality (0); Multiple nationalities or nationality not matching interview country (1)	0: 96.2% (f = 26 369) 1: 3.8% (f = 1055)
Image of EU	Categorical	Very positive (1); Fairly positive (2); Neutral (3); Fairly negative (4); Very negative (5)	M = 2.71 SD = 0.911
Attachment to EU	Categorical	Very attached (1); Fairly attached (2); Not very attached (3); Not at all attached (4)	M = 2.44 SD = 0.878

## Hypotheses

Sekulić, Massey and Hodson analysed which social forces were behind ‘Yugoslav identification’ (1994, p. 84). They measured the influence of modernization (urbanization, education, exposure to media), political participation (membership in the Communist Party, holding office in workplace and/or community organizations) and demographic factors (age and mixed ethnic background). While the forces of modernization and cross-national contacts, which transactionalist theory (Deutsch, 1954) saw as crucial for the establishment of supranational identities, are important for both polities, there are considerable differences in the degree of political pluralism. The EU as a far more plural polity has more than one party for which expressing support also means support for the EU, which was not the case for Yugoslavia as a one-party communist dictatorship.

The general aim of the paper is to uncover similarities and dissimilarities between the Yugoslav and the EU cases regarding supranational identification. In addition, we also presupposed that national contexts would shape European identification, i.e. that it would not be possible to have a model that can be replicated with equal success in chosen cases. Despite expecting national differences, we generated specific hypotheses that were not directed at a particular country. First, concerning *modernization*, we expect to see more modernized individuals (urban residence, higher education) to have higher primary European identification (H1). *Political participation* in the form of discussing EU matters (H2) was assumed to be positively correlated. We assumed that *having GAL* values, i.e. estimating climate change as one of the two most important EU issues and not pointing out immigration as one of the two most important EU issues would be positively correlated with primary European identification (H3). Because the EU is considered to be a centrist project (Marks, 2004, p. 239), we hypothesized that a *centrist political orientation* (H4) should predict European identification more than a non-centrist one. We further predicted a positive correlation between *non-exclusive nationality* (H5) and primary European identification. This also should have been the case with the positive perception of and attachment to the EU project (H6).

## Share of Yugoslavs and Europeans

In Socialist Yugoslavia we can see a considerable rise in the percentage of those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs in 1981 (Table 2). This was largely due to the rise of the number of Yugoslavs in the ethnically heterogeneous republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the province of Vojvodina, as well as in Croatia, which had a significant share of Serb population. In his analysis of the share of Yugoslavs on the municipal level Kukic demonstrated the importance of ethnic diversity (2019). Although Macedonia was ethnically heterogeneous, there were two reasons

for low levels of Yugoslav identification. Firstly, Macedonians were a nation which gained public recognition of distinct national identity for the first time in Socialist Yugoslavia (Adamson and Jović, 2004). Secondly, Albanians as a non-Slavic ethnic group<sup>11</sup> and the largest minority in Macedonia felt far less included in the process of unification of South Slavs and consequently had low levels of supranational identification. However, in the last Yugoslav census of 1991, which was conducted in an already disintegrating country, the percentage of Yugoslavs dropped sharply. This was most pronounced in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which soon became the main battlegrounds of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession.<sup>12</sup> Also in Serbia (contrary to trends in its provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) the share of Yugoslavs was almost halved.

**Table 2.** Percentages of Population of Yugoslavia Identifying Themselves as Yugoslavs in Yugoslavia and Within Each Republic and Province: 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991

Geographic area	Percentage identifying as Yugoslav				Predominant nationality in 1981	
	1961	1971	1981	1991		
<b>All of Yugoslavia</b>	1.7	1.3	5.4	3	36.3%	Serbian
<i>Republics and Provinces</i>						
<b>Croatia</b>	0.4	1.9	8.2	2.2	75.1%	Croatian
<b>Serbia (proper)</b>	0.2	1.4	4.8	2.5	85.4%	Serbian
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	8.4	1.2	7.9	5.5	39.5%	Muslim
<b>Kosovo</b>	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.2	77.4%	Albanian
<b>Macedonia</b>	0.1	0.2	0.7	-	67.0%	Macedonian
<b>Montenegro</b>	0.3	2.1	5.3	4.2	68.3%	Montenegrin
<b>Slovenia</b>	0.2	0.4	1.4	0.6	90.5%	Slovenian
<b>Vojvodina</b>	0.2	2.4	8.2	8.7	54.3%	Serbian

Sources: Sekulić, Massey and Hodson, 1994; Mrdjen, 2002 – unless otherwise indicated

<sup>11</sup> Hungarians in Vojvodina, although also a non-Slavic ethnic group, accepted Yugoslav identification more openly (Dugandžija, 1985), which could also be the result of Vojvodina being far more modernized than Kosovo.

<sup>12</sup> The first clash of what would eventually develop into the Croatian War of Independence happened in March of 1991 in Pakrac, the same month the census was compiled. Indicative is the demographic change in the nearby village of Donji Čaglić. In 1981 Yugoslavs made up 30% of the population, Croats 29% and Serbs 38%. In 1991 the share of Yugoslavs fell to 4% and the share of Croats (36%) and Serbs (53%) grew and demonstrated that supranational identification was becoming largely irrelevant ([https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr-el/Доњи\\_Чagliћ](https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr-el/Доњи_Чagliћ)).

In the last 30 years the share of Europeans on the EU level was more stable than in Socialist Yugoslavia. Compared to the baseline year (1992), European identification has overall not become more commonplace (Table 3). Levels and trends do, however, vary based on national contexts. Countries such as Luxemburg or Spain saw a rise in people identifying as European, but the examples of France and particularly Italy show that a decline is also possible, even in founding members. In France, a country in which European ideas were forged and spread throughout the continent (Parsons, 2003), and in Italy, which was long held as one of the most pro-European countries, the share of Europeans dropped below the average EU level. Both countries have recently witnessed the rise of radical right parties. Greece and Portugal, ethnically homogeneous Southern countries, have the lowest levels of primary European identification. The sharp decline in the share of Europeans was particularly evident in the recent period, as these two countries faced dire economic consequences during the Eurozone crisis. The curious case of the sharp rise of Europeans in Great Britain should be interpreted as a counter-reaction to Brexit. In Hungary the rise of Europeans could also be interpreted as a counter-reaction to the rising anti-EU nationalism of Orbán's government, as Europeans are overrepresented with leftist respondents.<sup>13</sup>

**Table 3.** Percentages of Respondents Identifying Themselves as Primary Europeans in EU-15 and Within Each EU Member State

	Percentage identifying as solely European or predominantly European						
	1992	2002	2012	2018			
EU-12	10.9%	11.7%	10.7%	11.7%	<b>Predominant ethnic group in 2010</b>		
EU-15	-	11.5%	10.5%	11.4%			
EU-25	-	-	9.8%	10.8%			
EU-27	-	-	10.2%	10.7%			
EU-28	-	-	-	10.6%			
<i>Countries</i>							
Austria	-	13.1%	10.1%	13.0%		93%	Austrian
Belgium	13.0%	15.0%	13.3%	18.1%		59%	Flemish
Bulgaria	-	-	7.6%	8.5%		83%	Bulgarian
Czech Republic	-	-	5.8%	8.9%		94.3%	Czech
Croatia	-	-	-	6.0%	89.6%	Croatian	

<sup>13</sup> Among leftist respondents, the share of Europeans is 20% ( $\chi^2 = 16.99$ ;  $p < .001$ ).

Cyprus	-	-	17.1%	4.7%	80.9%	Greek
Denmark	4.8%	6.5%	4.2%	5.0%	90.2%	Danish
Germany	12.1%	14.6%	15.3%	14.0%	92.4%	German
East Germany	10.3%	11.7%	11.3%	11.7%		
West Germany	13.9%	17.7%	17.8%	15.2%	67.9%	Estonian
Estonia	-	-	7.0%	6.0%		
Finland	-	4.5%	4.9%	4.7%	93%	Finnish
France	12.2%	12.4%	10.9%	9.6%	97.6%	French
Great Britain	9.0%	8.0%	6.6%	16.1%	81.5%	English
Greece	5.1%	5.5%	5.7%	2.8%	97%	Greek
Hungary	-	-	5.1%	11.5%	90%	Hungarian
Ireland	8.0%	6.9%	2.6%	4.5%	84.5%	Irish
Italy	13.1%	12.9%	9.8%	7.3%	99%	Italian
Latvia	-	-	11.3%	10.6%	58.6%	Latvian
Lithuania	-	-	6.0%	6.6%	83.5%	Lithuanian
Luxemburg	17.0%	28.1%	32.1%	25.6%	56.9%	Luxembourger
Malta	-	-	2.6%	3.2%	95.1%	Maltese
Netherlands	10.6%	9.1%	12.8%	10.7%	85%	Dutch
Poland	-	-	5.3%	6.3%	98.8%	Polish
Portugal	4.6%	6.4%	7.1%	2.1%	95.9%	Portuguese
Romania	-	-	21.5%	8.5%	89.5%	Romanian
Slovakia	-	-	8.5%	6.9%	80.6%	Slovak
Slovenia	-	-	7.2%	7.7%	83.1%	Slovenian
Spain	8.5%	8.8%	11.2%	13.7%	68%	Spanish
Sweden	-	6.1%	5.1%	4.8%	80.9%	Swedish

Sources: Eurobarometers 1992 (37.0), 2002 (57.1), 2012 (77.4) and 2018 (90.3).

Similarly to Socialist Yugoslavia, some of the countries with the highest share of Europeans are those which are ethnically heterogeneous such as Luxemburg, Belgium and Spain. This seems to also be the case with Latvia, which has the smallest share of titular nation population among post-socialist member states and the highest share of Europeans in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. However, contrary to the Yugoslav case and Serbia's below average levels of supranational identification in 1981 and 1991, the EU's most populous member state Germany has an above average level of primary European identification, although it has recently slightly fallen.



## Determinants of Supranational Identification

According to Sekulić, Massey and Hodson (1994), respondents from Socialist Yugoslavia were more likely to identify as Yugoslav if they lived in a more urban settlement, were a member of the Communist Party or community organization, were younger, and, most importantly, if they had nationally-mixed parentage. Binary logistic regression for Yugoslavia did not single out several variables as statistically significant predictors. Even some modernization variables, education and reading news were not predicting Yugoslav identification. The authors attributed these results to the control of curriculum content and mass media by republic-level Party organizations, which promoted national interests (*ibid.*, p. 94). We may add that particularly during the 1980s mass media opened up and even started challenging World War II narratives.

Statistical significance of coefficients in the EU-28 model (Table 4) should be interpreted with caution due to the large sample ( $N = 18\,079$ ).<sup>14</sup> In this case, due to the very small coefficient, age should not be seen as a good predictor even if it is statistically significant. Modernization variables (urban residence and education), on the other hand, did not prove to be statistically significant predictors of European identification even though the sample is large. Keeping in mind the large sample issue, all other variables' (except non-exclusive nationality) predictive power should be interpreted according to effect magnitude. Based on this model, primary European identification might be positively correlated with the respondents': more frequent discussing of EU matters, not considering immigration an important EU issue, considering climate change an important EU issue, not being centrist, being male, higher social class self-assessment, having a more positive image of the EU, as well as being more attached to the EU. Having a non-exclusive nationality, on the other hand, seems to be a strong predictor of European identification and shows more predictive power than all of the aforementioned. This parallels the findings on the Yugoslav case regarding nationally-mixed parentage, even though the variables are not identical. The presupposition that centrists would be more likely to identify as European proved questionable. Clark and Rohrschneider (2021, p. 189) note that there has been a change over the last two decades and that centrists are not immune to nationalist identities lowering support for the EU. The same authors speculate that the ageing of European populations now means that there are more older people supporting centrist politics, which is relevant because older people tend to be more attached to their nation state. Bearing in mind the impact of the large sample on the significance of predictors in the EU-28 model, the results obtained on the samples

<sup>14</sup> Excessively large samples increase the power of statistical tests and any effect can be statistically significant regardless of the magnitude (Fernandes *et al.*, 2020, p. 5).

of selected individual member states suggest that the specifics of national contexts can influence the importance and strength of different factors in shaping European identification in them.

**Table 4. Logistic Regression for Primary European Identification in EU-28**

Independent variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio (exp(b))	(exp(b)-1) x 100 (%)
<i>Modernization</i>				
Urban residence (1-3)	0.062	0.037	1.064	6.4%
Education	<b>0.018***</b>	0.005	1.018	1.8%
<i>Political participation and attitudes</i>				
Frequency of discussing EU matters	<b>-0.149***</b>	0.046	0.861	-13.9%
Immigration as an important EU issue	<b>-0.253***</b>	0.058	0.777	-22.3%
Climate change as an important EU issue	<b>0.240***</b>	0.070	1.271	27.1%
Centrist	<b>-0.265***</b>	0.058	0.767	23.3%
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>				
Age	<b>-0.008***</b>	0.002	0.992	0.8%
Gender (female)	<b>-0.245***</b>	0.056	0.783	21.7%
Social class self-assessment	<b>0.145***</b>	0.032	1.155	15.5%
<i>Non-exclusive nationality</i>				
Has more than 1 nationality or has non-native nationality	<b>1.311***</b>	0.104	3.708	270.8%
<i>Perception of the EU</i>				
More negative image of the EU	<b>-0.220***</b>	0.037	0.803	19.7%
Less attached to the EU	<b>-0.296***</b>	0.039	0.744	25.6%
Number of cases (N)	18 079			
Nagelkerke pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.136			

\* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001 (two tailed t-tests)

Sekulić, Massey and Hodson (1994, p. 94) found differences in determinants of Yugoslav identification between the analysed republics in 1989. Urban residence had the most effect in less developed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Party membership had the most effect in Croatia in 1989, when national relations between Serbs and Croats were intensely worsening. Party membership had less effect in Serbia, as the Party was already dominated by Slobodan Milošević and Serb nationalism.

Regarding European identification in particular member states, the two variables related to modernization were not statistically significant predictors in any of the three cases (Table 5), which mirrors the results of the EU-28 model. The same goes for age, even though we would have expected younger respondents to identify as Europeans more often than older respondents. On the other hand, gender differences seem to be relevant in Belgium and France, with women being less likely to primarily identify as European. Furthermore, although the odds ratios indicate that self-positioning in higher classes is positively correlated with Europeanness in all three cases, the logistic regression singled it out as a predictor only in France. Regarding political participation, we observe different results in the three countries. In contrast with the EU-28 model, frequency of discussing EU matters does not increase the odds of primarily identifying as European. Considering immigration to be an important EU issue is related to the dependent variable in Belgium and Germany. Puzzlingly, in Belgium considering immigration to be an important EU issue increases the odds of European identification, while in Germany it decreases them. In Belgium right-wingers are overrepresented in the sample of those who primarily identify as European. This mostly results from Europeans being overrepresented within Flemish centre-right and right.<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, considering climate change an important EU issue (an indicator of post-materialism) increases the odds of European identification in France and Germany. In Germany, not being centrist increases the odds of primary European identification. Analyzing the full left-right scale, it is plausible to conclude that this is a result of left-wingers being significantly more prone to identifying as Europeans than centrists and right-wingers.<sup>16</sup> Attachment to the EU has shown to be a statistically significant predictor only in Belgium. This indicates that Belgians, who feel a stronger attachment to the EU as supranational polity, are more likely to identify as Europeans than respondents from the other two countries. At the same time, perceiving the image of the EU negatively increases the odds of not identifying as European in France. Finally, the question of non-exclusive nationality yet again points to differences between national contexts. Taking into account the small subsample sizes,<sup>17</sup> for those who have a non-exclusive nationality, the analysis shows that having such characteristics increases the odds for European identification in Germany and France.

<sup>15</sup> Among rightist respondents, the share of Europeans is 34.1% ( $\chi^2 = 12.1$ ;  $p < .005$ ).

<sup>16</sup> Among leftist respondents in the EU, the share of Europeans is 16.2% ( $\chi^2 = 192.67$ ;  $p < .001$ ). Among leftist respondents in Germany, the share of Europeans is 20.7% ( $\chi^2 = 22.17$ ;  $p < .001$ ).

<sup>17</sup> In Belgium 57, France 23, Germany 45. The confidence intervals for the statistically significant odds ratios are: Germany: 95% CI [6 194 – 23 515]; France: 95% CI [2 577 – 16 276].

**Table 5.** Predictors in France, Belgium, Germany

Independent variable	Belgium		France		Germany	
	OR	%	OR	%	OR	%
<i>Modernization</i>						
Urban residence	1.264	26.4	1.209	20.9	1.193	19.3
Education	0.980	-2.0	1.011	1.1	1.028	2.8
<i>Political participation and attitudes</i>						
Frequency of discussing EU matters	1.025	2.5	0.692	-31.8	0.761	-23.9
Immigration as an important EU issue	<b>1.659**</b>	65.9	0.533	-46.7	<b>0.638**</b>	-36.2
Climate change as an important EU issue	1.062	6.2	<b>2.987***</b>	198.7	<b>2.245***</b>	124.5
Centrist	1.212	21.2	0.960	-4.0	<b>0.467***</b>	-63.3
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>						
Age	0.997	-0.3	1.011	1.1	0.993	-0.7
Gender (female)	<b>0.665*</b>	-33.5	<b>0.404**</b>	-59.6	0.935	-6.5
Social class self-assessment	1.278	27.8	<b>1.658**</b>	65.8	1.250	25.0
<i>Non-exclusive nationality</i>						
Has more than 1 nationality or has non-native nationality	1.748	74.8	<b>6.476***</b>	547.6	<b>12.323***</b>	11 323
<i>Perception of the EU</i>						
More negative image of the EU	0.918	8.2	<b>0.557**</b>	-54.3	0.796	-20.4
Less attached to the EU	<b>0.656**</b>	-34.4	1.065	6.5	0.837	-16.3
Number of cases (N)	804		618		1177	
Nagelkerke pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.08		0.27		0.21	

\* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001 (two tailed t-tests)

## Discussion and Conclusion

Looking at Yugoslav censuses and EB data, we can once again state low levels of Yugoslavs and Europeans in both polities. This may not be unexpected because the most powerful agents of the construction of Socialist Yugoslavia and the European project were not focused on the construction of a supranational identity that would replace existing national identities among people. The construction and wide acceptance of a supranational European identity that would be to the detriment of existing national identities is constrained by the fact that the construction of the European project has existed for only a few decades and given the fact that exist-

ing national identities in Europe have been built for centuries (Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz, 2012, p. 119). The results partly confirmed Fligstein, Polyakova and Sandholtz's (2012) argument that there are two sets of EU citizens and that the ones that have higher social status are more likely to become Europeans. Non-exclusive nationalities have been the strongest predictors of supranational identification in both Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU. This could indirectly support transactionalist theories, as people who have more contacts with other parts of supranational polities are more likely to have non-exclusive nationalities (through migration, mixed marriages and multiple citizenships). However, migration within the EU and Socialist Yugoslavia constituent parts was rather low throughout their existence. It remains to be seen whether relatively high CEE emigration to Western Europe will have deeper consequences for European identification in host societies or in CEE member states, if migrants decide to come back to their home societies.

The results show that nationally specific contexts affect both the prevalence of European identification and its determinants. There are considerable differences in the level of European identification among EU countries, and the statistical analysis of the Belgian, French and German cases further showed that different factors shape it. Particularly, the results showing that different political orientations can be connected to Europeanism indicate one of the main differences between Socialist Yugoslavia and the EU. In Belgium, one of the founding member states, having anti-immigrant attitudes increases the probability of identifying as European. Although Europe has been increasingly associated with leftist values (GAL), it does not stop some of the rightist respondents to identify as Europeans (even if they do it in order to avoid being identified as Belgian). This clearly shows different levels of pluralism in these two supranational polities and pluralism's positive influence on different types of identification with the supranational polity. For instance, Yugoslavism was throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century promoted by various clerics, particularly from the Catholic Church. However, in monarchist<sup>18</sup> and particularly in socialist Yugoslavia this dimension of Yugoslavism was completely abandoned. One could rightly argue that having both forces of modernization and partisan Yugoslavism as predictors of Yugoslav identification plus the development of different strands of Yugoslavism during the crisis-ridden 1980s showed increasing pluralism of the Yugoslav polity. However, large parts of the population, particularly religious parts, remained excluded from any notion of Yugoslavism.

On the other hand, the EU is a project which is interpreted by both Christian Democrats, who treat European founding fathers as saints, and various progressives, who see the EU as the beacon of post-materialist values, as belonging to

<sup>18</sup> The Right eventually became anti-Yugoslav oriented in all non-Serb nations of monarchist Yugoslavia.

them. Although those on the radical left may be critical of the EU, they do not reject European identification and could even mobilize to protect European integration. Also, there is an important “cultural European identification” which in CEE member states predated EU accession (Schilde, 2013). However, similar to the Yugoslav case, those who are more attached to the current supranational polity are also more likely to have supranational identification. Belonging to the Communist Party or feeling attached to the EU and having a positive image of it are correlated with supranational identification. It is important not to overstate the significance of the rise in the share of supranational identification as the rise of Yugoslavs coincided with the crisis of the 1980s, which brought the end of Socialist Yugoslavia. Even the establishment of supranational political forces and pop-cultural promotion of Yugoslav identity could not stop the growing polarization and disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia. The EU is also witnessing the emergence of supranational political movements with political actors who identify as primarily European. As we have seen, the rise in the share of Europeans in the UK and Hungary also indicates growing polarization around EU issues and, particularly in the British case, has not proved to have the ability to stop disintegration. However, in the EU we have not witnessed a sharp decline in the overall share of primary supranational identification as during the disintegration of Socialist Yugoslavia. Following Brubaker’s conceptual framework, it could be concluded that the supranational identification of European citizens depends on political and ideological entrepreneurs’ ability to promote the EU, Europeanism and European identification. These encouragements could lead to European self-understanding among individuals, but also commonality and connectedness among them, and finally generate groupness, which could become an important factor of social and political life. Also, the increase in upward mobility and particularly rising migration in the EU could raise the prospects of primary European identification. The lack of influence of the modernization variable (urbanization, education) could mean that as European societies became postmodern the modernization processes have run their course and could not push supranational identification further. Results also indicate that the time when the census was done should be taken in consideration. Socialist Yugoslavia was a major example of the importance of creating categories and classifications through which people can self-identify, a process which Brubaker described. In successor states, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, war brought significant reconfigurations and renaming of national groups continued (see Markowitz, 2007).

Lastly, we have to point out some limitations to this study and avenues for further research. Our design study was based on the article it was inspired by. This had several consequences. The three countries we analyzed are all Western European countries, meaning there is still a lacuna concerning insights on post-communist

member states. Given these countries' different historical and accession trajectories, it is plausible to expect that findings related to determinants of European identification would differ in them. Further research could also go in a different direction and could, instead of widening the number of cases, explore specific national contexts in even greater depth. Qualitative insights on what it means to be European could be particularly useful for expanding the debate on just what European identification means and what its dimensions might be. Moreover, in choosing to build on the previous study, we did not orient ourselves towards finding all of the possible pertinent explanatory variables. There are certainly more aspects that might explain why citizens primarily identify as European, such as transnational experiences, certain additional political attitudes, religiosity, etc. It should also be stated that the dataset itself somewhat limited our investigation. The question about European identification is not present in all of the datasets, and the breadth of potential explanatory in each dataset differs. For instance, the Eurobarometer we analyzed did not contain any variables about parentage, so we used the non-exclusive nationality variable. This is then related to an issue on the statistical side of things. Due to the low number of people with non-exclusive nationality, the odds ratios the regression produced have a wide interval of confidence, which means that even though we are confident about highlighting this characteristic's importance, it would be good to additionally test it.

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## Appendix

### Logistic Regression for Primary European Identification in EU-28 (All Countries Included)

Independent variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds Ratio (exp(b))	(exp(b)-1) x 100 (%)
<i>Modernization</i>				
Urban residence (1-3)	0.062	0.037	1.064	6.4%
Education	<b>0.018***</b>	0.005	1.018	1.8%
<i>Political participation and attitudes</i>				
Frequency of discussing EU matters	<b>-0.149***</b>	0.046	0.861	-13.9%
Immigration as an important EU issue	<b>-0.253***</b>	0.058	0.777	-22.3%
Climate change as an important EU issue	<b>0.240***</b>	0.070	1.271	27.1%
Centrist	<b>-0.265***</b>	0.058	0.767	23.3%
<i>Socio-demographic characteristics</i>				
Age	<b>-0.008***</b>	0.002	0.992	0.8%
Gender (female)	<b>-0.245***</b>	0.056	0.783	21.7%
Social class self-assessment	<b>0.145***</b>	0.032	1.155	15.5%
<i>Non-exclusive nationality</i>				
Has more than 1 nationality or has non-native nationality	<b>1.311***</b>	0.104	3.708	270.8%
<i>Perception of the EU</i>				
More negative image of the EU	<b>-0.220***</b>	0.037	0.803	19.7%
Less attached to the EU	<b>-0.296***</b>	0.039	0.744	25.6%
<i>Country effects</i>				
France	<b>1.117**</b>	0.405	3.056	205.6%
Germany	<b>1.285***</b>	0.393	3.615	261.5%
Belgium	<b>1.692***</b>	0.394	5.430	443.0%
Netherlands	<b>0.897*</b>	0.402	2.451	145.1%
Italy	<b>0.928*</b>	0.411	2.529	152.9%
Luxemburg	<b>1.219**</b>	0.412	3.385	238.5%
Denmark	0.238	0.418	1.268	26.8%
Ireland	-0.077	0.424	0.926	-7.4%
Great Britain	<b>1.563***</b>	0.399	4.772	377.2%
Greece	-0.204	0.455	0.815	-18.5%

Spain	<b>1.455***</b>	0.403	4.284	328.4%
Portugal	-0.217	0.458	0.805	-19.5%
Finland	-0.085	0.433	0.919	-8.1%
Sweden	-0.084	0.417	0.919	-8.1%
Austria	<b>1.065**</b>	0.403	2.900	190.0%
Cyprus	0.582	0.474	1.790	79.0%
Czech Republic	<b>1.109**</b>	0.408	3.030	203.0%
Estonia	0.424	0.435	1.528	52.8%
Hungary	<b>1.116**</b>	0.401	3.051	205.1%
Latvia	<b>0.907*</b>	0.410	2.476	147.6%
Lithuania	-0.039	0.449	0.961	-3.9%
Poland	0.332	0.421	1.394	39.4%
Slovakia	0.486	0.417	1.626	62.6%
Slovenia	0.497	0.425	1.643	64.3%
Bulgaria	<b>1.011*</b>	0.408	2.750	175.0%
Romania	<b>0.870*</b>	0.412	2.387	138.7%
Croatia	0.563	0.413	1.756	75.6%
Number of cases (N)	18 079			
Nagelkerke pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.136			

\* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001 (two tailed t-tests)

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