| Sažetak (hrvatski) | U radu se tematizira pojam materijalne istine, koji je posljednjih desetljeća anatemiziran u domaćoj doktrini i praksi, kao i s njime povezano istražno ili inkvizitorno načelo. Najprije se raspravlja o ulozi raspravnog suda u dokaznom postupku te o legitimacijskom značaju istine u njemačkom i engleskom kaznenom pravu, nakon čega se izlažu terminološki prijepori koje su pojmovi materijalne istine i istražnog načela izazvali u domaćoj literaturi. Središnji je dio rada posvećen tumačenju aktualnog zakonodavstva, i to tako što se prvo navode mjerodavne odredbe Zakona o kaznenom postupku, da bi se potom kritizirale tendencije negiranja pojma materijalne istine u pojedinim sudskim odlukama. U sljedećem se poglavlju argumentira tvrdnja da istražno načelo predstavlja ne samo ovlast nego i dužnost raspravnog suda, koja proizlazi iz cilja utvrđenja materijalne istine. Nakon toga se istražuje veza između istražnog načela i nedavno uvedene odredbe o teretu dokaza. U zaključku se ukratko navode glavni argumenti koji potvrđuju tezu da su materijalna istina i istražno načelo i dalje nosivi stupovi hrvatskog kaznenog postupka, uz sugestiju da se u zakonu ponovno izrijekom propiše dužnost istinitog i potpunog utvrđenja činjenica koje su od važnosti za donošenje zakonite odluke. |
| Sažetak (engleski) | The paper explores the concept of substantive truth, which, in the authors’ opinion, has been unjustly stigmatised in Croatian criminal jurisprudence and case law over the past decades, along with the so-called inquisitorial principle, i.e., the principle of judicial investigation. In order to establish a framework for the interpretation of the existing Croatian law, the paper first discusses, from a comparative legal perspective, the courts’ powers to order the taking of evidence, as well as the importance of truth in ensuring the legitimacy of judicial authorities. This section presents two legal systems: English law, as a representative of the common law tradition, and German law, as a representative of the civil law tradition. Subsequently, terminological disputes surrounding the concepts of substantive truth and the inquisitorial principle within Croatian legal doctrine in the past century are examined, leading to the conclusion that a significant portion of criticism directed at these concepts is a result of terminological rather than substantive disagreements. The central part of the paper focuses on the interpretation of current Croatian law. First, the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act are presented, followed by a critique of the tendencies to disprove the concept of substantive truth in certain judicial decisions. The next chapter substantiates, through the
analysis of judicial rulings, the claim that the inquisitorial principle is not only a power but
also a duty of the trial court, which arises from the goal of ascertaining the substantive truth.
Then, the connection between the inquisitorial principle and the provision on the burden of
proof, recently introduced in Croatian law, is explored. The authors argue that this provision
does not diminish the scope and significance of the inquisitorial principle. In conclusion, the
main arguments supporting the assertion that substantive truth and the inquisitorial principle
are foundational pillars of the Croatian criminal procedure are briefly summarised. Finally, it
is proposed that in future legislation the duty of the truthful and comprehensive determination
of all the facts that are crucial for rendering a lawful decision be expressly prescribed again |
