The aim of this paper is to deconstruct apparently clear and widely accepted notion of equality along different philosophical and theoretical lines. Equality in legal context is primarily a prescriptive one, although descriptive equality forms the basis for legitimate classifications. Consequently, the substantial equality immanently depends on the criteria the specific legal order chooses to apply when establishing what makes certain situations different, and which of the classifications should be considered justified. The first chapter deals with the three different lexical meanings equality has, while the second examines practical concepts which arose when applying this abstract notion to the social complexities. Equal treatment and recently developed concepts of equal opportunity are examined in the third chapter. The same chapter explains general problems of affirmative action. The very intriguing relationship between equality and justice is closely looked into in the fourth chapter. It also shows some of the possible justifications of affirmative action dependent on the standard of justice one applies. Finally, the fifth chapter discusses the overall role of equality in legal discourse. Special emphasis has been placed on the claims that equality is basically an empty idea which lacks relevant material standard of measurement, and several counterarguments have been offered.