When it comes to the shareholders' right to information, situations of withholding represent its counterbalance, which also shapes the content of that right, but with one crucial difference - the need for restrictive interpretation. The assessment lies with the company's management based on discretionary judgment. This opens the door to different actions in factually potentially similar situations, which becomes a source of legat uncertainty. Therefore, by examining legal doctrine and case law, the (practical) realisation oj the shareholders' right to injonnation will be explored through the interpretation of legal standards that lead to its withholding. The reasons for limiting this right lie in the need to protect the interests of the company, and they can be grouped. ln the first category are those that the law prescribes exhaustively, while in the second are limitations on the shareholders' right to information that arise from the legat authorisation to empower the chair man oj the general assembly, through the company 's articles of association or the rules oj procedure oj the general assembly, to impose appropriate time limits on the exercise of shareholders' rights to information and discussion. This paper aims to determine how the shareholders' right to information, i.e., the right of shareholders to ask questions to the company's management, is limited by the Shareholder Rights Directive, and how national legislators of EU member states have regulated this. The focus will be on the Croatian, Gennan, and Slovenian national regulations of the institute of withholding the shareholders' right to information, while research based on an expanded comparative law sample will highlight national legal differences concerning these rights, enabling the identification of the best comparative de lege ferenda legat solutions in Croatian law.